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Opportunities for external validation of behavioral models in the social sciences that are
based on randomized social experiments or on large regime shifts, that can be treated as
experiments for the purpose of model validation, are extremely rare. In this paper, we consider an
alternative approach, namely mimicking the essential element of regime change by non-randomly
holding out from estimation a portion of the sample that faces a significantly different policy
regime. The non-random holdout sample is used for model validation/selection. We illustrate the
non-random holdout sample approach to model validation in the context of a model of welfare
program participation. The policy heterogeneity that we exploit to generate a non-random hold-
out sample takes advantage of the wide variation across states that has existed in welfare policy. 
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JEL: C52, C53, J1, J2 A regime shift, as opposed to a randomized experiment, is characterized by a time lapse
1
between observations on the estimation sample (the control group) and those on the validation
sample (the treatment group). Over that period, changes may have occurred that would affect
behavior in ways not captured in the estimation. In addition, whatever assumption is made about
the exogeneity of a regime shift becomes part of the validation exercise.
 The use of models to forecast out-of-sample behavior is not uncommon. For example, in
2
the marketing literature, considerable effort has been devoted to forecasting demand for new
products. Few of the papers in that literature, however, compare predictions to  subsequent
demand after the product is introduced.




Opportunities for external validation of behavioral models in the social sciences that are
based on randomized social experiments or on large regime shifts, that can be treated as
experiments for the purpose of model validation, are extremely rare. Among the earliest
examples in which such a regime shift is exploited is work by McFadden (1977) on forecasting
the demand for rail rapid transport in the San Francisco Bay area. McFadden estimated a random
utility model (RUM) of travel demand before the introduction of the Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART) system, obtained a forecast of the level of patronage that would ensue, and then
compared the forecast to actual usage after BART’s introduction.  Since that work, there have
1
been, to our knowledge, only a handful of papers in the economics literature that have pursued a
similar method of model validation.
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McFadden’s model validation treats pre-BART observations as the estimation sample and
post-BART observations as the validation sample.  A similar opportunity was exploited by
3
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992). They estimated a model of retirement behavior of workers
in a single firm who were observed before and after the introduction of a temporary one-year
pension window. They estimated several models on data before the window was introduced and
compared the forecast of the impact of the pension window on retirement based on each
estimated model to the actual impact as a means of model validation and selection. Keane and
Moffitt (1998) estimated a model of labor supply and welfare program participation using data
after federal legislation (OBRA 1981) that significantly changed the program rules. They used They also developed model selection methods based on pre-program data alone.
4
 The use of laboratory experiments to validate economic models has, of course, a long
5
tradition. Bajari and Hortascu (2004) provide a recent example of evaluating a structurally
estimated auction model by comparing the estimated valuations to those randomly assigned in an
experimental setting.
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the model to predict behavior prior to that policy change. Keane (1995) used the same model to
predict the impact of planned expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1994-1996.    
   Randomized social experiments have also provided opportunities for model validation
and selection. Wise (1985) exploited a housing subsidy experiment as a means of evaluating a
model of housing demand. In the experiment, families that met an income eligibility criterion
were randomly assigned to control and treatment groups. Those in the latter group were offered a
rent subsidy. The model was estimated using only control group data and was used to forecast the
impact of the program on the treatment group. The forecast was compared to its actual impact.
Lalonde (1986) used data from a manpower training experiment to evaluate the ability of non-
experimental methods to replicate program effects. Heckman and Hotz (1989) developed
methods for choosing among alternative non-experimental methods using data on the control
group (and on a non-randomly chosen comparison group).   
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More recently, Todd and Wolpin (2002) made use of data from a large-scale school
subsidy experiment in Mexico, where villages were randomly assigned to control and treatment
groups. Todd and Wolpin estimated a behavioral model of parental decisions about child
schooling and work, as well as family fertility, using data on the control villages and used it to
predict behavior in the treatment villages. The validity of the model was then assessed according
to how well the forecast of the behavior of the treatment group under the program matched the
actual behavior. Similarly, Lise, Seitz and Smith (2003) used data from a Canadian experiment
designed to move people off of welfare and into work to validate a calibrated search-matching
model of labor market behavior.  
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When the model provides sufficient structure, and assuming that the model is deemed
 “valid”, it is possible to simulate the impact of regime shifts other than the one used for
validation. For example, Wise (1985) and Todd and Wolpin (2002) contrasted the effect of the  In this regard, the  “natural `natural experiments,`” literature suffers from the same
6
problem. This phrase has been used by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) to distinguish “natural
experiments” that are both natural, i.e., provided by nature, and experiment-like, in the sense of
random assignment, from those that are neither. 
 Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) and Bontemps, Robin, and Vandenberg (2000) follow a
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related, but somewhat different, method of validation. Each estimates an equilibrium model of
labor market search using data on individuals. The first paper estimates the model using data
only on unemployment durations and validates the model based on its predictions about the
distribution of accepted wages that is also observed in the data. The second uses data on
unemployment and employment spells and on accepted wages for a sample of individuals and
validates the model based on how well it predicts the relationship between a firm’s productivity
and the wage it pays based on firm data. The critical aspect is that the data not used in estimation
is unnecessary for model identification. The similarity to what we suggest is that both of these
studies purposively hold out some piece of non-randomly selected data that could have been used
in estimation. The difference is that all of the data is generated within the same regime.     
3
policies evaluated in the experiments to several alternative policies.
   All of these papers make use of what is, from the researchers perspective, a fortuitous
event. The common and essential element is the existence of some form of a regime change that
is radical enough to provide a degree of distance between the estimation sample and the
validation sample. The further away are the regimes in the estimation and validation samples, the
less likely the forecasted and actual behavior of the validation sample will be close purely by
chance. 
However, waiting for such events to arise, given their rarity, does not lead to a viable
research approach to model validation and selection.  In this paper, we consider an alternative
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approach, namely mimicking the essential element of regime change by non-randomly holding
out from estimation a portion of the sample that faces a significantly different policy regime. The
non-random holdout sample is used for model validation/selection.   Of course, using random
7
subsamples of the data as holdout samples in order to check for overfitting has been a common
procedure in statistics and econometrics. Unlike cross-validation methods, here the holdout
sample is chosen in a  non-random manner (i.e., precisely because it contains data from a very
different policy regime).  
We believe that there are many such opportunities in observational data. Some examples
are the substantial policy differences that exist across the 50 U.S. States, the availability of some See Moffitt (1992) for a review of the early literature based on static models. Previous
8
DP models of welfare participation include Sanders (1993) and Swann (1996).
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product varieties in particular cities and not in others, geographic differences in prices and local
variation in property or sales taxes. In this paper, we illustrate the non-random holdout sample
approach to model validation in the context of a model of welfare program participation. The
policy heterogeneity that we exploit to generate a non-random hold-out sample takes advantage
of the wide variation across states that has existed in welfare policy. Specifically, we formulate
and estimate a dynamic programming (DP) model of the joint schooling, welfare take-up, work,
fertility and marriage decisions of women using data from one group of U.S. states (the
estimation or “control” sample) and forecast these same decisions on another state (the validation
or “treatment” sample) that differs dramatically in the generosity of its welfare program. As a
comparison to the performance of the DP model, we also estimate several multinomial logit
(MNL) specifications, consistent with a static random utility model or a flexible approximation
to a DP model, albeit, to conserve on parameters, only for a subset of the choices.
Our model extends the literature on welfare participation in several dimensions.  We
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augment the choice set to include schooling and fertility in addition to work, marriage and
welfare participation. Moreover, in addition to considering a larger choice set, the modeling
framework with respect to each of these alternatives is richer. Specifically, with respect to the
work alternative, employment may be either part- or full-time and work experience augments
future wage offers. The markets for part- and full-time employment are treated as distinct. In
each period, with some probability a woman receives a part-time wage offer and, likewise, with
some probability a full-time wage offer. With respect to the welfare alternative, in addition to
stigma effects of participation, we also allow for effects of past welfare participation on labor
market and marriage opportunities. Moreover, we explicitly account for uncertainty about future
benefits and model welfare rules more completely than previously.
The marriage market is modeled in a search context. In each period a woman receives a
marriage offer with some probability that depends on her current characteristics. The permanent
earnings potential of the person she meets is drawn from a distribution that also depends on her
characteristics. If the marriage offer is accepted, the husband’s actual earnings evolve over time5
stochastically. The woman receives a fraction of the total of her earnings and her husband’s
earnings. If a woman is not married, there is some probability, determined by current
characteristics, that she co-resides with her parents. In that case, she receives a fraction of her
parents’ income that also depends on her characteristics.
In modeling the fertility decision, it is assumed that a woman receives utility from
children, but bears a time cost of rearing them that depends on their current age distribution.
Sequential decisions about school attendance are governed by direct preferences and by the
additional human capital, and thus wages, gained from schooling.   
 We implement the model using 15 years of information from the 1979 youth cohort of
the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience (NLSY79), supplemented with
state level welfare benefit rules that we have collected for each state over a 23 year period prior
to the new welfare reform. Benefit levels changed considerably over the decision-making period
of the women in the NLSY79 sample. We develop simplified representations of state- and year-
specific welfare benefit formulas to estimate forecasting rules for the agents that they are
assumed to use in the decision model. The model is estimated on five of the largest states
represented in the NLSY79 (California, Michigan, New York, North Carolina and Ohio) and
validated on data from Texas. In terms of generosity, California, Michigan and New York are
high benefit states, North Carolina and Ohio are medium benefit states and Texas is a low benefit
state.
All of the models, the DP model and the different specifications of the static MNL
models, perform well in terms of their fit to the estimation sample. Indeed, it is difficult to
choose among them. Performance on the validation sample is more varied. Specifically, based on
a root mean squared error criterion, a MNL specifications with state fixed-effects provide the
best out-of-sample predictions.
However, when we perform a counterfactual experiment that replaces the welfare benefit
realizations in the estimation sample states with those for Texas, the effects on behavior
predicted by the MNL fixed-effects model are seemingly perverse - welfare participation and
fertility increase substantially, while working declines substantially. The MNL specification that
replaces the state fixed-effects with state-specific mean benefits, representing permanent Being married and receiving welfare is not an option. A fecund woman faces 36 choices
9
and an infecund woman18 choices. Although the AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP)
6
differences in welfare generosity, leads to expected effects. Welfare participation declines and
employment increases. However, the increase in employment rates (in some cases, as large as 20
percentage points) substantially exceeds the fall in welfare take-up rates, which does not seem
plausible. Moreover, there is a significant drop in schooling, which contradicts the prediction of a
human capital model that an agent who expects to spend more time working and less time on
welfare has a greater incentive to invest in education. In contrast, the DP model predictions for
the counterfactual experiment are quantitatively more reasonable. The decline in welfare
participation rates exceeds the increase in employment rates (which are less than 5 percentage
points), and schooling increases slightly.    
Furthermore, the DP model has two important advantages. First, being more
comprehensive, it can be used to  forecast the effects of policy changes on additional variables of
interest: marriage rates, part- and full-time work, parental co-residence rates, husband’s income,
and wage offers for part- and full-time work. Second, it is possible to forecast the effect of
policies other than variations in benefit levels, for example, work requirements, time limits and
wage and school subsidies, among others.
The next section of the paper presents the structure of the DP model. Section 3 describes
the data, section 4 the estimation method and the following section the results. The final section
concludes.
II. Model
In this section, we provide an outline of the model. A complete description with exact
functional forms is provided in Appendix A. We consider a woman who makes joint decisions at
each age “a” of her lifetime about the following set of discrete alternatives: whether or not to
attend school, , work part-time,  , or full-time,  , in the labor market (if an offer is
received), be married (if an offer is received),  , become pregnant if the woman is of a fecund
age,  , and receive government welfare if the woman is eligible,  . There are as many as 36
mutually exclusive alternatives that a woman chooses from at each age during her fecund life
cycle stage and 18 during her infecund stage.  The fecund stage is assumed to begin at age 14 and
9program provided benefits for a family with an unemployed father, it accounts for only a small
proportion of total spending on AFDC. 
 In keeping with the assumption that pregnancies can be perfectly timed, we only
10
consider pregnancies that result in a live birth, i.e., we ignore pregnancies that result in
miscarriages or abortions. We assume that a woman cannot become pregnant in two consecutive
six month periods.
 In the model, we assume that women do not change their state of residence and restrict our estimation to
11
a sample with that characteristic.
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to end at age 45; the decision period extends to age 62. Decisions are made at discrete six month
intervals, i.e., semi-annually. A woman who becomes pregnant at age a has a birth at age a+1,
with  representing the discrete birth outcome.  Consumption,  , is determined uniquely by
10
the alternative chosen.
The woman receives a utility flow at each age that depends on her  consumption, as well
as her work, school, marital status, pregnancy and welfare participation choices. Utility also
depends on past choices, as there is state dependence in preferences, on the  number of children
already born,  , and their current ages (which affect child-rearing time costs), and the current
level of completed schooling,  (which affects utility from attendance). Marriage and children
shift the marginal utility of consumption. We also allow preferences to evolve with age, and to
differ among individuals by birth cohort, race and U.S. state of residence, and by a permanent
unobservable characteristic which we denote by a woman’s type.  The disutility of time spent
11
working, attending school, child-rearing or collecting welfare (i.e., non-leisure time), as well as
the direct utilities or disutilities from school, pregnancy and welfare participation (unrelated to 
the time cost), and the fixed cost of marriage, are each subject to age-varying preference shocks.
Expressing the utility function in terms of the current set of alternatives, the utility of an
individual at age a who is of type j is  
where   is a vector of five serially independent preference shocks and    represents the subset   is the indicator function equal to one when the term inside is true and zero
12
otherwise.
   reflects the fact that welfare recipients are restricted in what they may purchase with
13
welfare benefits, e.g.,  food stamps cannot be used to purchase alcohol. In addition, the exact
treatment of parents’ income is quite complicated, varying among and within  states (at the local
welfare agency level) and over time. Rather than attempting to model the rules explicitly, as an
approximation we instead estimate the fraction of parents’ income that is subject to tax as a
parameter, .  
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of the state space (the set of past choices and fixed observables) that affects utility.    
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Monetary costs, when unmeasured, are not generally distinguishable from psychic costs.
It is thus somewhat arbitrary as to what is included in the utility function as opposed to the
budget constraint. For example, we include in (1) (see Appendix A): (i) a fixed cost of working;
(ii) a time cost of rearing children that varies by their ages; (iii) a time cost of collecting welfare
(waiting at the welfare office); (iv) a school re-entry cost; and (v) costs of switching welfare and
employment states.   
The budget constraint, assumed to be satisfied each period, is given by:
where   is the woman’s own earnings at age a,    is the spouse’s earnings if the woman is
married,  is the share of household income the woman receives if she is married,   is her
parents’ income, a share,  , of which she receives if she co-resides with her parents,   is the
amount of welfare benefits the woman is eligible to receive.   is a fraction that converts welfare
dollars into a monetary equivalent consumption value,   represents the fraction by which
welfare benefits are reduced if the woman lives with her parents and varies with the level of the
parents’ income,   is the tuition cost of college and   the cost of graduate school,   is the
completed level of schooling at age a and  is an indicator function equal to unity when the
argument in the parentheses is true.  Income is pooled when married, but not when co-residing
13
with parents.9
Living with parents and being married are taken to be mutually exclusive states. In
particular, a woman who chooses to be married, conditional on receiving a marriage offer (see
below), cannot live with her parents while a woman who does not choose to be married lives
with her parents according to a draw from an exogenous probability rule, . We assume that the
probability of co-residing with her parents, given the woman is unmarried, depends on her age.
The woman’s share of her parents’ income, when co-resident, depends on her age, her parents’
schooling and whether she is attending post-secondary school.
It is assumed that there is stochastic assortative mating. In each period a single woman
draws an offer to marry with probability  , that depends on her age and welfare status. If the
woman is currently married, with some probability that depends on her age and duration of
marriage, she receives an offer to continue the marriage. If she declines to continue, the woman
must be single for one period (six months) before receiving a new marriage offer.
In each period a woman receives a part-time job offer with probability   and a full-
time job offer with probability  . Each of these offer rates depends on the woman’s previous-
period work status. If an offer is received and accepted, the woman’s  earnings is the product of
the offered hourly wage rate and the number of hours she works, .
The hourly wage rate is the product of the woman’s human capital stock,  , and its per unit
rental price, which is allowed to differ between part- and full-time jobs,   for j=p, f.
Specifically, her ln hourly wage offer is
The woman’s human capital stock is modeled as a function of completed schooling, the stock of
accumulated work hours up to age a,  , whether or not the woman worked part- or full-time in
the previous period, her current age and her skill endowment at age 14. As with permanent
preference heterogeneity, the skill endowment differs by race, state of residence and unobserved
type. Random shocks to a woman’s human capital stock,  , are assumed to be serially
independent.
The husband’s earnings depends on his human capital stock,  . Conditional on  The human capital rental price is impounded in this term.. In addition, husband’s labor
14
supply is assumed to be an exogenous component of his earnings.
10
receiving a marriage offer, the potential husband’s human capital is drawn stochastically. The
human capital of the spouse that is drawn depends on a subset of the woman’s characteristics, her
schooling attainment, age, race, state of residence and unobserved (to us) type. In addition, there
is an iid random component to the draw of the husband’s human capital that reflects a permanent
characteristic of the husband unknown to the woman prior to meeting,  . The woman can
therefore profitably search in the marriage market for husbands with more human capital, and can
also directly affect the quality of their husbands by the choice of her schooling. There is a fixed
utility cost of getting married, which augments a woman’s incentive to wait for a good husband
draw before choosing marriage (we allow for a cohort effect in this fixed cost). After marriage,
the woman receives a utility flow from marriage, as well as a share of husband income. After
marriage, husband’s earnings evolve with a fixed trend subject to a serially independent random
shock, .  Specifically,
where   is the deterministic component of the husband’s human capital stock.
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Welfare eligibility and the benefit amount for a woman residing in state s at calendar time
t depends on the number of children residing with her and on her household income. For any
given number of minor children (under the age of 18,  ) residing in the household, the
schedule of benefits can be accurately approximated by two line segments. The first line segment
corresponds to the guarantee level; it is assumed (approximated) to be linearly increasing in the
number of minor children and, in the case of a woman co-residing with her parents, linearly
declining in parents’ income,  . The second line segment is negatively sloped as a function of
the woman’s own earnings,  , plus parents’ income if she is co-resident, and also linearly
increasing in the number of minor children. The negative slopes reflect the benefit reduction (or
tax) applied to income.
In general, benefits are equal to the guarantee level (for given numbers of children and As noted, it is assumed that a woman remains in the same location from age 14 on. 
15
Clearly, introducing the possibility of moving among states in a forward-looking model such as
this would greatly complicate the decision problem.  
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parents’ income if co-resident) up to a positive level of the woman’s earnings (the two line
segments intersect at positive earnings) in order to provide a child care allowance for working
mothers. Denoting this (state-specific) level of earnings, the disregard, as  and the level
of earnings at which benefits become zero (where the second line segment intersects the x-axis)
as  , the benefit schedule for a woman with children is given by
We refer to  as the benefit rule and to the  ‘s as the benefit rule parameters. We
exclude   from this set for reasons that will become clear.
The benefit rule parameters, and thus benefits themselves, change over time. Therefore, 
if women are at all forward-looking, they will incorporate their forecasts of the future values of
the benefit rule parameters into their decision rules. We assume that benefit rule parameters
evolve according to the following general vector autoregression (VAR) and that women use the
VAR to form their forecasts of future benefit rules:
where   and    are  column vectors of the benefit rule parameters,  is a   column
vector of regression constants,   is a  matrix of autoregressive parameters and   is a
column vector of iid innovations drawn from a stationary distribution with variance-
covariance matrix  . We call (6) the evolutionary rule (ER) and  ,  ,  the parameters of
the ER. Evolutionary rules are specific to the woman’s state of residence.
15 Allowing for a longer decision period at ages past 45 reduces the computational burden
16
of the model (see Wolpin (1992)).
12
Objective Function:
The woman is assumed to maximize her expected present discounted value of remaining
lifetime utility at each age. The maximized value (the value function) is given by
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of future preference shocks, labor market,
marriage and parental co-residence opportunities, and the distribution of the future innovations of
the benefit ER. The decision period is six months until age 45, the assumed age at which the
women becomes infecund, but one year thereafter.  In (7), the state space   denotes the
16
relevant factors known at age a that affect current or future utility or that affect the distributions
of the future shocks and opportunities. 
Decision Rules: 
The solution to the optimization problem is a set of age-specific decision rules that relate 
the optimal choice at any age, from among the feasible choices, to the elements of the state space
at that age. Recasting the problem in a dynamic programming framework, the value function,
, can be written as the maximum over alternative-specific value functions, denoted as
, i.e., the expected discounted value of choice  , that satisfy the Bellman equation,
namely 
 A woman at each age a (permanently) residing in state s, and thus facing a benefit rule given by
(6), with current state   (including realizations of the benefit rule parameters corresponding to Because the size of the state space is large, we adopt an approximation method to solve
17
for the Emax functions. The Emax functions are calculated at a limited set of state points and
their values are used to fit a polynomial approximation in the state variables consisting of linear,
quadratic and interaction terms. See Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997) for further details. As a
further approximation, we let the Emax functions depend on the expected values of the next
period benefit parameters, rather than integrating over the benefit rule shocks.
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the calendar time the woman is age a, preference shocks, own and husband’s earnings shocks,
parental income shocks, and labor market, marriage and parental co-residence opportunities),
chooses the option with the greatest expected present discounted value of lifetime utility.
Solution Method:
The solution of the optimization problem is in general not analytic. In solving the model
numerically, one can regard its solution as consisting of the values of    for
all j and elements of  . We refer to this function as   for convenience. As seen in (10),
treating these functions as known scalars for each value of the state space transforms the dynamic
optimization problem into the more familiar static multinomial choice structure. The solution
method proceeds by backwards recursion beginning with the last decision period.  
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III. Data
The 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience
(NLSY79) contains extensive information about schooling, employment, fertility, marriage,
household composition, geographic location and welfare participation for a sample of over 6,000
women who were age 14-21 as of January 1, 1979. In addition to a nationally representative core
sample, the NLSY contains oversamples of blacks and Hispanics. We use the annual interviews
from 1979 to 1991 for women from the core sample and from the black and Hispanic
oversamples.
The NLSY79 collects much of the relevant information, births, marriages and divorces,
periods of school attendance, job spells, and welfare receipt, as dated events. This mode of
collection allows the researcher the freedom to choose a decision period essentially as small as
one month, i.e., to define the choice variables on a month-by-month basis. Although the exact
choice of the length of a period is arbitrary, we adopted as reasonable a decision period of six
months. Periods are defined on a calendar year basis, beginning either on  January 1 or on July 1 Beginning with the 1981 interview, school attendance was collected on a monthly basis
18
for the prior calendar year. In the two prior interviews, attendance was ascertained at the
interview date and, if not attending, the date of last attendance was obtained. If a woman was
attending (not attending) at the time of the1979 interview, which, in every case, took place during
the first six months of 1979, and similarly in the first period of 1980 according to the above rule,
then the individual was coded as attending (not attending) in both periods of 1979. If attendance
differed between the two years, enrollment was considered missing in the second half of 1979.
We do not use the data prior to 1979 because only the last spell of non-attendance, and then only
for individuals not attending at the 1979 interview, can be determined. In addition, because
reported attendance and completed schooling levels were often longitudinally inconsistent, the
attendance data was hand-edited to form a consistent attendance-highest grade completed profile.
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of any given year. We begin the analysis with data on choices starting from the first six month
calender period that the woman turned age 14 and ending in the second six month calendar
period in 1990 (or, if the woman attrited before then, the last six-month period in which the data
are available). The first calendar period observation, corresponding to that of the oldest NLSY79
sample members, occurs in the second half of 1971. There are fifteen other birth cohorts who
turned age 14 in each six month period through January, 1979.  
We restrict the sample to the six states in the U.S. that have the largest representations of
NLSY79 respondents: California, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Texas.
However, the estimation is performed using only the first five states. Texas is used as a holdout 
or validation sample on which to perform out-of-sample validation tests of the model. The reason
for this choice is that, as shown below, Texas is by far the least generous state in terms of welfare
benefits and thus requires an fairly extreme out-of-sample extrapolation.      
As noted, we consider the following choices: whether or not to (i) attend school (ii) work
(part- or full-time), (iii) be married, (iv) become pregnant and (v) receive welfare (AFDC). The
variables are defined as follows:  
School Attendance: The NLSY79 collects data that permits the calculation of a
continuous monthly attendance record for each women beginning as of January, 1979. A woman
was defined to be attending school if she reported being in school each month between January
and April in the first six-month calendar period and each month between October and December
in the second calendar period.  Given the sample design of the NLSY79, school attendance
18
records that begin at age 14 exist only for the cohort that turned 14 in January, 1979.15
School attendance prior to age 14 is not explicitly treated as a choice. However,
completed schooling at any age, including at age 14 (which we refer to as initial schooling),
affects opportunities and thus choices. Given the sample design, we know initial schooling only
for one of the cohorts. Thus, an estimation procedure has to deal with this serious missing initial
conditions problem as well with the missing observations for many of the cohorts on schooling
choices between age 14 and their age as of the first interview.
Employment Status: At the time of the first interview, an employment history was
collected back to January 1, 1978, which provided details about spells of employment with each
employer including the beginning and ending dates (to the week) of employer attachments as
well as gaps within employer-specific spells. Subsequent rounds collected the same information
between interview dates. Using this information together with data on usual hours worked at each
employer, we calculated the number of hours worked in each six month period. A woman was
considered working part-time in the period (500 hours) if she worked between 260 and 779 hours
and full-time (1000 hours) if she worked at least 780  hours during the period. As with school
attendance, employment data does not extend back to age 14 for many of the cohorts. We assume
that initial work experience, that is, at age 14, is zero.    
Marital Status: The NLSY79 provides a complete event-dated marital history that is
updated each interview. However, dates of separation are not reported. Therefore, for the years
between 1979 and 1990, data on household composition was used to determine whether the
woman was living with her spouse. But, because these data are collected only at the time of the
interview, marital status is treated as missing during periods in which there were no interviews,
in most cases for one six-month period per year. Marital event histories were used for the periods
prior to 1979 even though it is uncertain from that data whether the spouse was present in the
household. 
Pregnancy Status: Although pregnancy rosters are collected at each interview, conception
dates are noisy and miscarriages and abortions are under-reported. We ignore pregnancies that do
not lead to a live birth, dating the month of the conception as occurring nine months prior to the
month of birth. Except for misreporting of births, there is no missing information on pregnancies
back to age 14 for any of the cohort. This method of data collection has led to a serious seam problem. In the monthly data,
19
there are many more transitions out of welfare between December of one year and the following
January than there are between any two months within any calendar year. We attempt to account
for this problem in the empirical specification we adopt. 
 The use of almost any cutoff in establishing welfare participation would have only a
20
small effect on the classification; most women who report receiving welfare in any one month
during a six month period report receiving it in all six months.
16
Welfare Receipt: AFDC receipt is reported for each month within the calendar year
preceding the interview year, i.e., from January 1978.  The respondent checks off each month
from January through December that a payment was received.  We define a woman as receiving
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welfare in a period if she reported receiving an AFDC payment in at least three of the six months
of the period.  As with school attendance and employment, data are missing back to age 14 for
20
most of the cohorts. It is assumed that none of the women received welfare prior to age 14, as is
consistent with the fact that none had borne a child by that time.
Descriptive Statistics:
Table 1 provides (marginals of) the sample choice distribution by full-year ages and by
race aggregated over the five states used in the estimation. As seen, school attendance is
essentially universal until age 16, drops about in half at age 18, the normal high school
graduation age, and falls to around 10 percent at age 22. About 3 percent of the sample attends
school at ages after 25. The implied school completion levels that result from these attendance
patterns are, at age 24, 12.9 for whites, 12.7 for blacks and 12.2 for Hispanics.
Employment rates for white and Hispanic women (working either part- or full-time)
increase rapidly through age 18 and then slowly thereafter, although they are higher for whites
throughout by about 10-20 percentage points. Employment rates for black females rise more
continuously, roughly doubling between age 18 and 25, and are comparable to that of Hispanics
at ages after 25.
Marriage rates rise continuously for whites and Hispanics, reaching about 60 percent by
age 25 for whites and 50 percent for Hispanics. However, for blacks, marriage rates more or less
reach a plateau at about age 22, at between 20 and 25 percent. With respect to fertility, it is more
revealing to look at cumulative children ever born rather than at pregnancy rates within six-17
month periods. By age 20, white females in the sample on average had .28 live births, black
females .47 live births and Hispanic females .40 live births. Teenage pregnancies that lead to a
live birth are higher by 68 percent for blacks than for whites and by 43 percent for Hispanics than
for whites. By age 27, the average number of live births are 1.06, 1.36 and 1.39, and by age 30,
1.54, 1.61 and 1.76. Viewed differently, the first age at which the sample women have had one
child on average was 27 for whites, 24 for blacks and 24.5 for Hispanics.
Welfare participation naturally increases with age, at least through age 24, given the
eligibility requirement associated of having had at least one child.  Race differences are large; at
its peak, participation reaches 7 percent for whites, 28 percent for blacks and 17 percent for
Hispanics
Figures 1-12 provide a contrast between the five states used in estimation (the estimation
sample) and Texas (the validation sample), by race, for these behaviors and for other variables
used in the estimation of the model. The largest differences are seen for AFDC take-up and for
full-time employment, and especially for black and Hispanic females. In particular, as seen in
figure 1, among black women, welfare receipt peaked at about 30 percent in the estimation
sample, while it peaked at only about 10 percent in the validation sample. The difference for
Hispanics at the respective peaks was about 10 percentage points. Full-time employment (figure
2) also differs considerably for all races, being larger in Texas than in the other states. At age 25,
for example, the difference in the proportion engaged in full-time work was 14.3 percentage
points for whites, 18.9 percentage points for blacks and 19.6 percentage points for Hispanics.
Part-time rates are shown in figure 3.
School enrollment rates (figure 4) are higher in Texas for whites at all ages, leading to a
mean level of completed schooling that is .4 years more at age 25, but very little different for
blacks and Hispanics. Pregnancy rates (figure 5) are too volatile to discern differences between
the samples. However, there is a difference in the number of children ever born (figure 6),
although essentially only for whites; at age 26, the mean number of children ever born is about
one in the estimation sample, but only .75 in Texas. Marriage rates (figure 7) are lower in Texas
for whites (by 9 percentage points at age 26) , but higher for blacks (by 16.1 percentage points)
and for Hispanics (by 8.1 percentage points). The age profile of the proportion of women residing These regressions are available on request.
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  See appendix table A.2 for summary statistics of the actual parameters themselves.
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with a parent (figure 8) is similar across the samples for each race. The rest of the figures contrast
mean spousal income (figure 9), mean parental income when co-resident (figure 10) and mean
accepted wages when working full time (figure 11) and part-time (figure 12).   
Benefit Rules:
In order to estimate the benefit schedules (5) and the evolutionary rules governing
changes in benefit parameters (6), we collected information on the rules governing AFDC and
Food Stamp eligibility and benefits in each of the 50 states for the period 1967-1990. The
parameters of the benefit schedule are obtained by estimating (5) for each state separately in each
year using the sum of the monthly benefits from AFDC and Food Stamps, with monthly benefit
amounts expressed in 1987 New York equivalent dollars. Thus, for each state, s, we obtained an
estimate of the benefit rule parameters,  , for each year t. The approximation
given by (5) fits the monthly benefit data quite well, with R-squared statistics for the first line
segment mostly above .99 and for the second, mostly about .95.  Given the estimates of the
21
benefit rule parameters, we then estimated (6), the evolutionary rule.   
Table 2 transforms the benefit parameters obtained from the estimates of (5) into a more
convenient set of benefit measures, namely the total monthly income of non-working women
(with zero non-earned income) who have either one or two children and the total monthly income
of women with one or two children who have part-time monthly earnings of 500 dollars or full-
time earnings of 1000 dollars.  Referring to table 2, among the six states,  NY, CA and MI are
22
considerably more generous than NC, OH and TX. Among the first group Michigan is the most
generous, with average benefits over the 24 years for a woman with one child being 654 (1987
NY) dollars per month, and among the second group Texas is the least generous, with the same
average benefits figure only 377 dollars. CA and NY were about equally generous on average
(589 and 574 dollars) over the period as were NC and OH (480 and 489 dollars). Figure 13
shows the same data by individual years and compares the actual benefit to that predicted from
the estimate of (5). They are very close. As seen, the benefit level for one child is considerably Benefit reduction rates for AFDC and for Food Stamps are federally set.  They differ
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across states in our approximation due to the fact that AFDC payments terminate at different
income levels among the states while food stamp payments are still non-zero and the two
programs have different benefit reduction rates.  There is thus a kink in the schedule of total
welfare payments with income that our approximation smooths over.  
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lower for Texas in every year and the actual and predicted levels are almost identical. Benefit
reduction rates, net of child-care allowances, are fairly high. For example, a woman who had two
children and earned 500 dollars per-month while working part-time would have kept 70 per cent
of her earnings if she resided in Texas and about 60 per cent if she resided in any of the other five
states.   
23
As table 2 and figure13 also reveal, there was a steep decline in benefit amounts between
the early 1970's and the mid 1980's, and relative constancy thereafter. For example, in Michigan
monthly benefits fell from 735 dollars for a woman with no earnings and two children in 1975 to
561 dollars in 1985. For the same woman with 500 dollars in monthly earnings, benefits fell from
762 dollars in 1975 to 405 dollars in 1985, and then rose slightly to 484 dollars in 1990.  
IV. Estimation Method:
The numerical solution to the agents’ maximization problem provides (approximations
to) the Emax functions that appear on the right hand side of (8). The alternative-specific value
t functions, V   for k=1,..,K, are known up to the random preference shocks, the wage offer shock
k
of the woman and the earnings shock of the husband (if the woman receives a marriage offer),
the implicit shocks that determine whether a marriage offer is received and whether the woman
will reside with her parents if she is not married, and the benefit parameter shocks in the
evolutionary rule.
Thus, conditional on the deterministic part of the state space, the probability that an agent
is observed to choose option k takes the form of an integral over the region of the several-
dimensional error space such that k is the preferred option. The error space depends on which
option k is being considered. If option k corresponds to a work option, then the wage offer is
observed by us, and the wage shock is not in the subset over which the integration occurs. In that
case, the likelihood contribution for the observation also includes the density of the wage error. If
the woman is married (living with parents), then the husband’s (parents’) income is observed by Kernel smoothed frequency simulators are, of course, biased for positive values of the
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smoothing parameter, and consistency requires letting the smoothing parameter approach zero as
sample size increases.
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us, that shock is excluded from the integration and the likelihood contribution includes the
husband’s (parents’) income density. 
As noted, the choice set contains as many as 36 elements. It is well known that evaluation
of choice probabilities is computationally burdensome when the number of alternatives is large. 
Recently, highly efficient smooth unbiased probability simulators, such as the GHK method (see,
e.g., Keane (1993, 1994)), have been developed for these situations. Unfortunately, the GHK
method, as well as other smooth unbiased simulators, rely on a structure in which there is a
separate additive error associated with each alternative. Further, as discussed in Keane and
Moffitt (1998), in estimation problems where the number of choices exceeds the number of error
terms, the boundaries of the region of integration needed to evaluate a particular choice
probability are generally intractably complex. Thus, given our model, the most practical method
to simulate the probabilities of the observed choice set would be to use a kernel smoothed
frequency simulator. These were proposed in McFadden (1989), and have been successfully
applied to models with large choice sets in Keane and Moffitt (1998) and Keane and Wolpin
(1997).
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However, in the present context, this approach is not feasible because of severe problems
created by unobserved state variables. Because, as we have noted, we do not have a complete
history of employment, schooling or welfare take-up for most of the cohorts back to age 14, the
state variables accounting for work experience, schooling and welfare dependence cannot be
constructed. Parental co-residence is also observed only once a year as is marital status that takes
into account spousal co-residence. 
Further complicating the estimation problem, as also noted, is that the youth’s initial
schooling level at age 14 is observed only for one of the 16 cohorts. It has been well known since
Heckman (1981) that unobserved initial conditions, and unobserved state variables more
generally, pose formidable computational problems for estimation of dynamic discrete choice
models. If some or all elements of the state space are unobserved, then to construct conditional21
choice probabilities one must integrate over the distribution of the unobserved elements. Even in
much simpler dynamic models than ours, such distributions are typically intractably complex.  
In a previous paper (Keane and Wolpin (2001)), we have developed an simulation
algorithm that deals in a practical way with the problem of unobserved state variables. The
algorithm is based on simulation of complete (age 14 to the terminal age) outcome histories for a
set of artificial agents. An outcome history consists of the initial school level of the youth,  ,
along with simulated values in all subsequent periods for all of the outcome variables in the
model (school attendance, part- or full-time work, marriage, pregnancy, welfare participation, the
woman’s wage offer, the husband’s earnings, parents’ income). The construction of an outcome
history can be described compactly as follows:
At the current trial parameter value:
1) Draw the youth’s initial schooling and parents’ schooling from the joint distribution;
2) Draw the relevant set of random shocks necessary to compute the alternative-specific
value functions at a=1;
3) Choose the alternative with the highest alternative-specific value function;
4) Update the state variables;
5) Repeat steps (2) – (4) for a=2, ... , A;
Repeat steps (1) - (5) N times to obtain simulated outcome histories for N artificial
persons.  Denote by   the simulated outcome history for the nth such
person, , for n = 1,..., N.
In order to motivate the estimation algorithm, it is useful to ignore for now the
complication that some of the outcomes are continuous variables. Let   denote the observed
outcome history for person i, which may include missing elements. Then, an unbiased frequency
simulator of the probability of the observed outcome history for person i,  , is just the
fraction of the N simulated histories that are consistent with  . In this construction, missing
elements of   are counted as consistent with any entry in the corresponding element of  . 
Note that the construction of this simulator relies only on unconditional simulations. It does not
require evaluation of choice probabilities conditional on state variables. Thus, unobserved state
variables do not create a problem for this procedure.22
Unfortunately, this algorithm is not practical.  Since the number of possible outcome
histories is huge, consistency of a simulated history with an actual history is an extremely low
probability event. Hence, simulated probabilities will typically be 0, as will thus be the
likelihood, unless an impractically large simulation size is used (see Lerman and Manski 1981).
In addition, the method breaks down completely if any outcome is continuous, e.g., the woman’s
wage offer, regardless of simulation size, because agreement of observed with simulated wages is
a measure zero event.
We solve this problem by assuming, as is apt, that all observed quantities are measured
with error. With measurement error there is a nonzero probability that any observed outcome
history might be generated by any simulated outcome history. Denote by   the
probability that observed outcome history   is generated by simulated outcome history  . 
Then   is the product of classification error rates on discrete outcomes and measurement
error densities for wages that are needed to make   and   consistent. Observe that
 for any  , given suitable choice of error processes. The specific measurement
error processes that we assume are described below. The key point here is that   does
not depend on the state variables at any age a, but only depends on the outcomes.
Using N simulated outcome histories we obtain the unbiased simulator
 (11)    .
Note that this simulator is analogous to a kernel-smoothed frequency simulator, in that
is replaced with an object that is strictly positive, but that is greater if   is “closer” to 
. However, the simulator in (11) is unbiased because the measurement error is assumed to be
present in the true model. 
It is straightforward to extend the estimation method to allow for unobserved
heterogeneity. Assume that there are K types of women who differ in their permanent preferences
for leisure, school, marriage, becoming pregnant and receiving welfare. In addition, women also
differ in their human capital “endowment” at age 14 and in their potential husband’s human
capital stock. To handle unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. types) in this framework, define   as
the probability a person is type k given his initial school level, for k = 1,..., K, where K is the Initial schooling is exogenous conditional on type. We also take the parents’ schooling
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as an initial condition exogenous conditional on type. 
To ensure that the measurement error is unbiased, the probability that the reported value
26
is the true value must be a linear function of the predicted sample proportion (see the appendix A
for details). Obviously, measurement error cannot be distinguished from the other model
parameters in a non-parametric setting.  As in the model without measurement error,
identification relies on a combination of functional form and distributional assumptions, and
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number of types.  In this case, simulate N/K vectors   for each type.   Then,
25
(12)   .
Observe that in (12), the conditional probabilities  are weighted by the ratio of the
proportion of type k according to the model,   , to the proportion of type k in the simulator,
N/K.  
The simulator in (12) is not smooth because   will “jump” at points where a
change in the model parameters causes the simulated outcome history   to change discretely.  
However, this simulator can be made smooth in the model parameters if an importance sampling
procedure is applied, with the simulated outcome histories are held fixed and re-weighted as
parameters are varied. Given an initial parameter vector   and an updated vector  , the
appropriate weight to apply to sequence    is the ratio of the likelihood of simulated history n
under   to that under  . Such weights have the form of importance sampling weights (i.e., the
ratios of densities under the target and source distributions), and are smooth functions of the
model parameters. Further, it is straightforward to simulate the likelihood of an artificial history 
 using conventional methods because the state vector is fully observed at all points along the
history. The choice probabilities along a path   are simulated using a kernel smoothed
frequence simulator. As this construction renders   a smooth function of the model
parameters, standard errors can be obtained using the BHHH algorithm.  
Lastly, it is necessary to describe the specific assumptions for the measurement error
processes. First, we assume that discrete outcomes are subject to classification error. The
structure we adopt is simply that there is some probability that the reported response category is
the truth and some probability that it is not.  Second, we assume that the continuous variables
26exclusionary restrictions. Keane and Sauer (2005) have applied this algorithm successfully with
more general classification error processes
 These regressions are available on request.
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are also subject to measurement error. In particular, we assume that the woman’s wage offer error
and the husband’s income error are multiplicative and the parents’ income error is additive.  
Both of these measurement errors are assumed to be serially independent and independent of
each other. 
V. Results
To provide a comparison for assessing the fit of the dynamic programming (DP) model,
we have also estimated a multinomial logit (MNL) that relates four of the choice variables,
welfare take-up, school attendance, work and pregnancy, to the state variables of the model at
each age. We actually estimated four different specifications of the MNL, but present  the results
for now of only the one that best fit the estimation and validation samples.  The variables
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included are the benefit amount for a woman with one child and no earnings, state dummies, age
and age squared, parents schooling, whether the woman was on welfare, worked or was pregnant
in the previous period, whether the woman was pregnant two periods before, the number of
children already born to the woman, the woman’s years of schooling and its square, whether the
woman was living in a nuclear family at age 14, and race dummies. There are 13 mutually
exclusive choices (3 were combined because of small cell size) and 240 parameters.
Notice that the DP model is more comprehensive, including also a marriage decision and
distinguishing between working full or part time, and also embedding additional structural
relationships (functions describing the probability of living with a parent, husband’s income if
married and parent’s income if co-resident, and full and part-time wage offers). Nevertheless,
that DP model has a similar number of parameters. 
  Table 3 shows the fit to the estimation sample for the MNL and the DP models by four
age groups (15-17.5, 18-21.5, 22-25.5, 26-29.5) for each race separately. Although there are clear
differences in the fit of the two models, neither seems to be uniformly better. For example, the
MNL fits welfare take-up better for blacks than does the DP model, but fits Hispanics worse and
whites about the same. Similarly, the MNL model seems to fit the work alternative better for25
Hispanics at earlier ages, but the DP model fits better at later ages.  Both models capture well age
trends and quantitative differences by race.  The table also compares the fit to two of the state
variables, the mean number of children ever born before ages 20, 24 and 28, and the mean
highest grade completed by age 24. The performance is similar with respect to these measures,
except for the severe overstatement of schooling for Hispanics by the MNL model.
Table 4 presents the same comparison for the validation sample. The MNL clearly does
better than the DP model in terms of welfare take-up, especially for blacks in the last age group.
However, other differences seem to be small. As with the estimation sample, age trends and
racial differences are captured well. Neither model is very far off in forecasting children ever
born or schooling.
Table 5 shows the fit of the DP model to all of the other variables for both the estimation
sample and the validation sample. The fit with respect to the estimation sample is uniformly
good, capturing well age trends and racial differences. In some cases, the fit is remarkably close.
For example, because of selection, fitting accepted wages when working percentages are low is
challenging, as is fitting husband’s earnings when marriage rates are low or parent’s income
when co-residence with parents is low. Nevertheless, the DP model predictions are quite close to
the actual data. For example, predicted mean accepted wage rates are often within 5 percent of
the actual wage rates. 
To provide a summary of the overall fit to the estimation and validation samples, table 6
provides the root mean squared error (RMSE), calculated from the deviations between actual and
forecasted age-specific means, for the four MNL models that were estimated and for the DP
model. Starting from the MNL model described previously, denoted by MNL1 - FE in the table,
where FE indicates the inclusion of state dummies, the other models were: (i) same as the base
model without state fixed effects and including the mean one-child benefit for the state over the
period 1967-1990, denoted as MNL1 - No FE; (ii) same as the base model except that the five
state-specific benefit parameters were included in the specification separately, denoted as MNL2
- FE ; (iii) same as MNL2-FE except that there are no state dummies and the means of the five
benefit parameters over the 1967-1990 period are included, denoted by MNL2 - No FE. 
With respect to the estimation sample, all of the MNL models appear about equally as To forecast Texas for the MNL models with state dummies, we re-estimated the model
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on Texas data with a Texas state dummy, constraining all other parameters to be the same as in
the estimation sample. 
 The chi-square statistic for the joint test that all of the additional benefit parameters are
29
zero has a p-value of .000.
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good. In terms of RMSE, the DP model is also about as good. Notable exceptions are the better
fit of the DP model to school attendance among whites (.028 vs. .044 for MNL1- No FE), the
worse fit of the DP model to work (.066 vs. .030 for MNL- No FE) and to pregnancy (.021 vs.
.015 for MNL1 - FE and No FE) for blacks, and the better fit of the DP model to welfare (.024
vs. .044 for MNL1 - FE), to work (.048 vs. .059 for MNL2 - FE) and to school attendance (.033
vs. .048 for MNL1 - No FE) for Hispanics.
Large differences in fit emerge for the validation sample.  Among the MNL models, the
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two that include state dummies (MNL1 - FE and MNL - FE) have the lowest root mean squared
errors. Although adding the additional benefit parameters provides a statistically significant
improvement in the estimation-sample fit, there is no discernible impact on the root mean
squared error for the validation sample.
29
Using the mean one-child benefit instead of the state dummies (MNL1 - No FE vs.
MNL1- FE), does negatively affect the RMSE; for example, the largest changes are from .068 to
.093 for work and from .046 to .086 for school attendance for whites, from .021 to .030 or
welfare for blacks, and from .050 to .062 for work and from .059 to .034 for school att4endance
for blacks.
But, the differences are much greater for the MNL2 models. Dropping the state dummies,
and instead including the five state-specific mean benefit parameters, increased the RMSE
enormously. The fit to welfare was particularly adversely affected, rising from .010 (MNL2 - FE)
to .815 (MNL2 - No FE) for whites, from .021 to .844 for blacks and from .014 to .842 for
Hispanics. Essentially, the MNL - No FE specification predicted very high take-up rates in Texas
(see below), presumably the opposite of what one would expect given the considerably less
generous welfare benefits in Texas.
Recall that in specifications that included only the one-child benefit (MNL1), instead of27
the five benefit rule parameters (MNL2), dropping the state fixed-effects did not lead to such a
serious deterioration of the fit to Texas. We take this result as evidence that the validation sample
is capable of identifying over-fitting in a way that the within-sample significance test was not. 
The DP model uniformly does not fit as well as MNL1 - FE and overall fits slightly worse
than MNL1 - No FE, although in isolated instances it does fit better. Based on the evidence from
this validation exercise, it would therefore appear that MNL1 - FE would be the best model to
use for counterfactual experiments. 
Table 7 reports on the results from a counterfactual experiment where the estimation
sample states are given Texas’ welfare benefits. We report on the effects for both MNL1
specifications and for the DP model. The predicted effects from the MNL1 - FE specification are
seemingly perverse. Welfare take-up and fertility are predicted to increase substantially, while
there is a similarly large decline in work. The predictions from the MNL1- No FE specification
are exactly the opposite, a large reduction in welfare take-up, a large increase in work and a
relatively small reduction in fertility. 
Keane and Wolpin ( 2001) noted an important distinction between specifications with and
without state-specific effects. If women are forward looking, the effect of a change in welfare
benefit rules on behavior depends critically on how that change affects expectations about future 
benefit rules. Changes in welfare benefits can have very different effects depending on whether
they are perceived as being permanent or transitory. Estimates that use different sources of
variation in benefits, variation across states versus variation within states over time, may result in
different estimates simply because they identify responses to benefit changes that may be
perceived as having different degrees of permanence.
For example, if benefits rules are changed from year-to-year, the effect of a change in the
current year’s rules on fertility will depend on the degree to which the change is viewed as
permanent. This, in turn, depends on the process by which benefits evolve and how potential
welfare recipients form expectations. Keane and Wolpin (2001) note that, if the perceived benefit
process is such that an increase in benefits in one year is anticipated to be followed by declines in
subsequent years, then it is possible that  fertility may actually respond negatively to the
transitory increase. Thus, the counterfactual using MNL1 - FE is not, under this interpretation, One possibility is that the over-time variation in benefits on which the fixed effects
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models rely is correlated with other factors that drive welfare caseloads. For example, increases
in caseloads due to recessions or demographic shifts might induce the states to reduced benefits.
This could induce a short run negative correlation between caseloads and benefits, leading the
fixed-effect model to produce the “wrong sign” on benefits. Models without fixed-effects, since
they rely more on permanent cross-state variation in benefit levels to identify benefit effects,
would be less sensitive to this problem. 
Table 8 shows the effects of the counterfactual experiment for the DP model on
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additional variables. Effects are predicted to be quite small. For example, by ages 26-29.5, the
marriage rate is predicted to increase by only 0.3 percentage points (from 65.6 to 65.9 percent)
for whites, by 0.6 percentage points (from 28.2 to 28.8 percent) for blacks and by 1.2 percentage
points (from 55.7 to 56.9 percent) for Hispanics. 
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identifying the effect of replacing the estimation sample states’ welfare systems with Texas’
system. Nevertheless, it seems implausible that this explanation alone could lead to the very large
increases in welfare participation seen in Table 7.
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On the other hand, MNL1 - No FE replaces not only benefit realizations but also the
mean, and thus, the permanent level of benefits as well. However, the effects predicted by MNL1
- No FE appear to be implausible as well. For example, while welfare participation among whites
falls by 3.8 percentage points (from 4.5 to 0.7 percent) at ages 26-29.5, employment increases by
12.2 percentage points. Indeed, for all three race groups, the reduction in welfare participation is
less than the increase in employment at all ages. The prediction that employment rates would
reach close to 90 percent with the adoption of Texas’ welfare benefits is implausible. In addition,
the reduction in benefits leads to a fall, rather than an increase, in schooling. 
The counterfactual based on the DP model, which accounts for the entire set of welfare
parameters, replaces each of the estimation sample state’s benefit realizations as well as its
evolutionary rule (as in ( 6)) with that of Texas’ realizations and rule. The resulting effects are
more modest than in the MNL1 - No FE specification. The largest effects are for Hispanics,
where welfare participation falls by as much as 5 percentage points (from 15.3 to 10.2 percent) at
ages 22-22.5 and employment increases by 3 percentage points at those ages. For all races, within
each age group, the fall in welfare participation is larger than the increase in employment. In
addition, for each race, mean schooling by age 25 increases, though very slightly. The results
from the DP model appear more reasonable than the MNL - No FE specification.
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VI. Conclusions:
In this paper, we have presented and structurally estimated a dynamic programming (DP)
model of life-cycle decisions of young women. The model significantly extends earlier work on
female labor supply, fertility, marriage, education and welfare participation by treating all five of
these important decisions as being made jointly and sequentially within a life-cycle framework.
Needless to say, the resulting model is quite complex, and many behavioral and statistical
assumptions were needed to make its solution and estimation feasible. Of course, the model is
literally false, as our assumptions are designed to abstract from and simplify the full complexity
of how people really make life-cycle decisions. Thus, the model is simultaneously both
mathematically complex, yet highly stylized as a depiction of actual behavior. Nevertheless, we
believe that such models, tightly specified on the basis of very specific theoretical and statistical
assumptions, are potentially quite useful for policy analysis. The issue is how to develop faith, or
validate, that such a model is indeed useful. 
Classical statistical procedures offer limited guidance on how to proceed with validation.
Because the model is literally not true, classical specification tests which take as the null
hypothesis that the model is the true data generating process will reject the model for a large
enough sample size. But this does not mean that the model is not “useful” in the sense that it
might provide reasonably accurate predictions about the effect of interesting potential policy
interventions, or at least predictions that are better than existing models. Analogously,
engineering models of mechanical and physical systems are also literally false, but they have
proved very useful in predicting how the behavior of such systems would be affected by design
changes. But how can we learn whether a model does indeed provide accurate predictions?
One option is to wait for the real world to produce policy interventions (or to produce
them ourselves through social experiments), and then check the accuracy of the model’s
predictions of the impact of the intervention. The problem with this approach is that policy
interventions of this kind don’t come along very often and social experimentation is costly. This
is presumably (at least in part) why the economics literature contains so few examples where
actual or manufactured policy changes have been used to help validate models.
An alternative is to pursue a range of approaches to model validation as we have done in30
this paper. First, we have examined the fit of our model to the in-sample data that was used in
estimation across a range of dimensions of interest. In that context, we also have compared the fit
of the DP model to a group of flexible models, specified as multinomial logits, for a subset of the
choice data that our model describes. Using a RMSE criterion (the number of parameters are
similar), there seems to be no clear winner in this cross-model competition. Based on these
results, our view is that the DP model fits the in-sample data reasonably well (i.e., after seeing
the fit, we continued to view the model as potentially useful for prediction). 
Second, as we have emphasized, we have used, as a non-random holdout sample, data
from the state of Texas, which had a very different welfare policy regime from the five states that
were used in estimation. Based on our own subjective standards, the DP model predicts behavior
in Texas acceptably well, as do three of the four MNL models we consider. But one of the
models (MNL2-No FE) produced predictions for Texas that are terribly inaccurate by any
standard, leaving us with no faith in its usefulness. In terms of the RMSE criterion, the model we
called MNL1-FE fits the data from Texas a bit better than the DP model, but, based on this
evidence, we continued to view our model and the three remaining MNL models as potentially
useful for policy analysis.
Our third method of validation was to use the models to predict the effect of a policy
intervention that has no analogue in the historical data, but where we have fairly tight priors on
certain aspects of what might possibly happen. The counterfactual experiment was to give the
five estimation states the same welfare rules as Texas. Our strong priors were: (i) that welfare
participation should drop, since the Texas benefits are less generous, (ii) that work should
increase, but that the decline in welfare places a reasonable upper bound on the increase in work,
and (iii) that education should not decrease (since human capital becomes more valuable in an
environment with less generous income support). To our surprise, given their acceptable
performance in terms of in-sample fit and prediction for the hold-out sample Texas, all three
“surviving” MNL models severely violated one of more of these strong priors. Thus, we came to
view all four MNL models as unreliable for policy prediction. In contrast, the predictions of the
DP model were consistent with our priors.
In summary, the DP model has, in our judgement, performed well on three different tests Of course, this experiment provides only an imperfect validation tool because other
32
aspects of the economic and social environment may have changed.
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of validity. In light of this evidence, we have updated our priors about the potential usefulness of
the model (for policy prediction) in a favorable direction. Our research strategy is to continue to
look for opportunities to further validate the model, and as these opportunities arise they will
either increase or reduce our confidence in the model’s usefulness. 
One opportunity is presented by the important changes in welfare rules that occurred
beginning in the mid-1990s, after our sample period ended. This included EITC expansion,
imposition of work requirements for receipt of benefits, and benefit receipt time limits. As
discussed in Fang and Keane (2004), there was substantially heterogeneity across states in terms
of how exactly these policy changes were structured, and we can use our model to simulate the
impact of these changes on a state-by-state basis.
32
As a final observation, we conjecture that most economists would have professed a
greater a prior faith in the ability of the MNL models to forecast behavior than in the DP model.
That is, they would be concerned that, because the many assumptions invoked in setting up the
DP model could all be questioned, it is unlikely such a model could forecast accurately. In
contrast, they would view the MNL models, which simply model the value of each alternative as
a flexible function of the state variables, as being much less “restrictive.” Thus, the poor
predictions that the MNL models produce for the counterfactual of giving other states the Texas
benefit rules should serve as a cautionary tale, from which we draw two morals.
First, economists should be concerned with model validation regardless of the estimation
approach; one needs to hold all models to the same standard. Second, our experience illustrates
well the potential strengths of DP models for making policy predictions. It is precisely the
economic structure of the model that constrains it to make predictions that are reasonable in
certain dimensions. That is, the economic assumptions assure that work won’t increase more than
welfare falls when we make benefits less generous, and also that school should go up in these
circumstances. The MNL models’ failure is, at least in part, attributable to the fact that they lack
sufficient economic structure to impose such reasonable constraints on their predictions.
Economics is indeed valuable in econometrics.          32
References
Bontemps, Christian, Jean-Marc Robin and Gerard J. van den Berg. “Equilibrium Search with
Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Nonparametric Estimation.”
International Economic Review, 41, May, 2000, 305-358.
Eckstein, Zvi and Kenneth I. Wolpin. “Estimating a Market Equilibrium Search Model from
Panel Data on Individuals.” Econometrica, 58, July, 1990, 783-808.
Heckman, James J. and V. Joseph Hotz. “Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental
Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Manpower
Training.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 84, December, 1989, 862-874.
Keane, Michael P. “Simulation Estimation for Panel Data Models with Limited Dependent 
Variables.” in G.S. Maddala, C.R. Rao and H.D. Vinod eds., Handbook of Statistics 11,
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1993,  545-572.
                      . "A New Idea for Welfare Reform," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review, 1995, 19, 2-28.
                      . “A Computationally Practical Simulation Estimator for Panel Data.”
Econometrica, 62, January, 1994, 95-116.
Keane, Michael P. and Robert Moffitt.  “A Structural Model of Multiple Welfare Program
Participation and Labor Supply.”  International Economic Review, 39, August 1998, 
553-590.
Keane, Michael and Rob Sauer. “A Computationally Pratical Simulation Estimati0on Algorithm
for Dynamic Panel Data Models with Unobserved Endogenous State Variables.” mimeo,
Yale University, 2005.
 Keane, Michael P. and Kenneth I. Wolpin. “The Solution and Estimation of Discrete Choice
Dynamic Programming Models by Simulation and Interpolation: Monte Carlo Evidence.”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, November 1994,  684-672.
                                   .  “The Career Decisions of Young Men.”  Journal of Political Economy, 105, June
1997,  473-522.
                                  .  “Estimating Welfare Effects Consistent with Forward-Looking Behavior, Part I:
Lessons From a Simulation Exercise.” Journal of Human Resources, 37, Summer, 2001, Appendix A:
In this equation we present the specific functional forms for equations 1, 3 and 4 in the main text,
as well as the mathematical expressions for some aspects of the model that were only described
verbally in Sections II and IV.
  
I. Utility Function:
where the  , j=1, 5, 6, 7, 8, are the utilities or disutilities from (the linear term) in non-leisure
time, a pregnancy, getting married , school attendance and welfare participation. They are given
by: 
where r=2 denotes Black and r=3 denotes Hispanic. Notice that these five preference parameters,
which correspond to the five choice alternatives in the model, are allowed to differ by observed
initial conditions and by the latent “type”. In addition, each has an associated preference
shock that we assume is normally distributed (see blow). Having one shock associated with
each choice alternative assures that likelihood is not degenerate. 
Non-leisure time consists of the time required to raise the “effective”or age-weighted
number of children existing at age a (which we denote by  ), along with school time, the timerequired to collect welfare, a fixed time-cost of work, and actual work hours, as follows:
The formula for the “effective” number of children is given by :
a a-1 where n  denotes a  newborn child at age a (which results from a pregnancy at age a-1, p =1).
a The time required to care for a newborn is the numeraire (i.e., n  has a coefficient of 1), and we
estimate the time required for other children relative to that required for a newborn. For this
purpose, we group children into three age categories: 1 to 6, 7-13, and 14-17. Thus, for example,
2,1 the time required to care for a newborn is " , while that requited to care for a 5 year old is
2,1 3,1 " ·" .  
II. Labor Market:
A. Wage Function:
Note that  shifts the intercept in the part-time wage equation relative to that for full-time
wages. The stochastic term  is assumed normal, and the type specific intercept (or “skill
endowment”)   is given by
Here,   represents the skill endowment in the baseline case (a type 1 white woman in
California), while  represents the skill endowments of women with the other combinations
of initial conditions (IC). Note that k=1,..., 90, since there are 90 possible combinations of
S/r/type, and that  = 0.B. Full and Part-Time Job Offer Probability Functions:
III. Marriage Market
The woman receives marriage offers each period with a probability that depends on her state
variables. If she receives an offer, it can be thought of as consisting of two parts (i) the shock to
the woman’s fixed cost of marriage, which may capture the non-earnings qualities of the
potential mate, and (ii) the earnings capacity of the potential mate. The earnings capacity of the
potential husband is drawn from a distribution that depends on the woman’s state variables,
including her human capital level , as follows:   
A. Husband’s Income Function:
where
Note that in A.4, the skill endowment enters through the intercept, while offers are also allowed
to depend on the woman’s schooling, age and the duration of the marriage. The quadratic in
duration is meant to capture movement of the husband along his life-cycle wage path.  
Note that whether a woman is black or Hispanic and State of residence are allowed to
enter in addition to  . This may appear redundant, since  already depends on these
varables. However, the idea here is that, even controlling for her skill endowment, schooling and
age, it may be the case that, e.g., a white woman in New York draws from a better husband
income distribution than a black woman in North Carolina. 
The parameter :  is a permanent part of the husband earnings function which the woman
m
knows at the time she decides on a marriage offer, and which, should she accept the offer,
remains fixed for the duration of the marriage. On the other hand,  is a stochastic component
of husband earnings that will fluctuate from period-to-period during the marriage (and which the
woman cannot anticipate in advance). Bot are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zeroand standard deviations and  respectively.
B. Marriage Offer Probability Function:
where
Notice that the probability of receiving a marriage offer depends on lagged marital status.
Already married women may, or may not, receive offers. Thus, in the model, divorce may be
initiated by the husband (no offer is made) or by the wife (an offer is received but rejected). Note,
however, that the fixed cost of marriage is only borne at the start of a marriage, not when an
already married woman accepts an offer to continue a marriage. 
C. Husband’s Transfer Function:
If married, the woman receives a share of total household income according to:
where  is simply a constant.
IV. Parental-Residence, Parental Income, and Parental Transfers:
Co-residence is not a choice, but is rather determined by a simple stochastic process that depends
on age. Co-resident or dependent children receive transfers from parents that depend both on (i)
parental income, and (ii) a sharing rule, which depends on the child’s decisions, such as college
attendance:  
A. Parental Co-Residence Probability Function:
where
B. Parents’ Income Function:where S  denotes the parents’ schooling level (determined as the highest of the two parents if the
Z
youth is from a two parent household).
C. Parents’ Transfer Function:
where
V. Initial Conditions
The parental schooling level is taken as given, and it determines both the probability of one of
four possible initial schooling levels that the youth might have at the start of the year when they
first age 14 (i.e., 6  through 9  grade), and the probability that the youth is one of six latent
th th
skill/preference types, according to the following MNL equations:  




Our estimation procedure described in section IV requires us to assume that all discrete and
continuous variables in the model are measured with error.
A. Classification Error Rates for Discrete Outcomes:
We specify the classification error process in such a way that aggregate choice frequencies are
unbiased. To see how this works, consider first the classification error process for school
attendance:
probability that school attendance is correctly recorded at age a.
probability that school attendance is reported when person did not attend school. 
Then we assume that:
where  is the probability in the simulation (i.e., the “true” aggregate 
choice frequency for school at age a, up to simulation error) and Es is an error rate parameter to
be estimated. With this measurement error process, the model’s prediction for the aggregate
frequency with which school will be observed at age a is:
  
Thus, the model makes the same prediction for the “true” aggregate rate of school attendance at
age a, and for the “observed” aggregate rate of school attendance at age a. Similar classification
error processes are assumed for all the other discrete variables in the model: hours (which recall,
is either part of full time), pregnancy, welfare receipt, marriage, living with parents, initial
schooling and parents’ schooling. Following previous notation, the corresponding parameters are
Eh, Eb, Eg, Em, Ep, E , E .
B. Measurement Error in Continuous Outcomes:
For hourly wages, we assume the same measurement error variance in both the full-time and part
time wage equations. Thus, we have:Similarly, husband’s income is assume to be measured with log normal measurement error, with
mm standard deviation F , while parent’s income in levels is assumed to be measured with normal
mm measurement error with standard deviation F . 
Suppose that, according to simulated choice history  , a person true choice at age a was
not working, or not married, or not living with parents. Yet, in the data,   we observed that the
person is working, or is married, or is living with parents. Our method described in section IV
reconciles the two via classification error, and, for the discrete outcomes, the appropriate
likelihood contribution is trivial: it is simply the probability the person is observed to work, be
married or be living with parents, when in truth they are not. This probability is simply a function
of  the classification error rates constructed above. 
But a more subtle problem arises in a case where the simulated history says a person was
not working, or not married, or not living with parents, and, in the data, we not only observe a
different discrete outcome, but also observe a wage, or husband earnings or parent’s income.
What is the density of an observed wage conditional on the person not actually working? We
make the simple assumption that such “falsely reported” continuous outcomes are drawn from
the same distribution as that which governs the “true” continuous outcomes, except for a mean
shift parameter that we estimate. We denote these mean shift parameters 6-w, 6-m, and 6-z for
the woman’s offer wage function, husband earnings function and parent’s income function
respectively. During estimation, 6-w never departed to any significant extent from zero, so we




 Summary Statistics of Parameters of Benefits Rules by State: 1967-1990 (a,b) 
 
 
  b0  b1  b2  b3  b4 
 
CA           
m  454  134  503  .64  166 
s    53      9    47  .15    12 
Min  332  108  393  .24  143 
Max  517  148  579  .89  286 
           
MI           
m  498  155  553  .63  193 
s    78    16  118  .11   19 
Min  389  130  391  .53  146 
Max  649  181  744  .92  221 
           
NY           
m  430  144  472  .63  179 
s   38   24   65  .13    32 
Min  374  117  384  .48  142 
Max  522  182  590  .92  234 
           
           














                                                                                           Table A.1, continued 
 
 
  b0  b1  b2  b3  b4 
NC           
m  393    86  423  .52  110 
s    42   18    83  .11    20 
Min  332   48  295  .41   84 
Max  462  111  545  .82  148 
           
OH           
m   371  118  415  .58  143 
s    26    12    71  .10    23 
Min  337  100  308  .47             114 
Max  415  143  539  .88  183 
           
TX           
m  278    99  327  .44  112 
s    42    16   64  .08    24 
Min  206   50  235  .34    81 
Max  354  120  468             .56  149 
           
           
           
a.  1987 NY dollars 












 Evolutionary Rules for Benefit Parameters
a 
 
  CA    MI 
 
  b0t  b1t  b2t  b3t  b4t    b0t  b1t  b2t  b3t  b4t 
 
 





























































































































2  .88  .53  .48  .60  .23    .89  .84  .94  .50  .74   
P. Value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00   
Mean  454  134  503  .64  166    498  155  553  .63  193   




                                                                                                    Table A.2, continued 
 
                                   NY    NC 
 
 




 b0,t-1  .851 
(.065) 












b1,t-1  -  .891 
(.031) 












b2,t-1  -  -  .856 
(.072) 












b3,t-1  -  -  -  .665 
(.105) 












b4,t-1  -  -  -  -  .860 
(.041) 


































                R
2  .61  .92  .73  .54  .91    .97  .95  .95  .75  .86   
     P. Value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Mean  430  144  472  .63  179    393  86  423  .52  110   
 RMSE  22.9  6.4  33.3  .074  8.7    7.3  3.5  17.8  .042  7.5   
 
 
                                                                                                   Table A.2, continued 
 
OH    TX 
 
  b0t  b1t  b2t  b3t  b4t    b0t  b1t  b2t  b3t  b4t 
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-  .904 
(.082) 
 
































2  .79  .75  .94  .48  .84    .75  .47  .74  .75  .74   
P. Value  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Mean  371  118  415  .58  143    278  99  327  .44  112   
RMSE  11.4  5.7  16.0  .056    9.0    21.5  9.4  32.3  .038  12.1 
 
 
  Table A.3  Parameter Estimates 
 
Utility Function
a     
  Hours Pregnancy  Marriage  School  Welfare 
Intercept  α1,0 -2.266  α5,0 0.000  α6,0 -16.985  α7,0 3.202  α8,0 -1.578 
     (.321)    ------     (2.772)     (.516)    (1.023) 
State Effects  α1,1 -0.710  α5,1 1.174  α6,1 -2.555  α7,1 0.915  α8,1 0.801 
    (.109)    (.260)    (1.045)    (.167)    (.189) 
  α1,2 -0.333  α5,2 -0.080  α6,2 -5.723  α7,2 0.786  α8,2 -0.400 
    (.091)    (.196)    (.912)    (.138)    (.122) 
  α1,3  1.007  α5,3 -0.946  α6,3 8.463  α7,3 -0.451  α8,3 -0.437 
    (.128)    (.304)    (1.082)    (.185)    (.174) 
  α1,4  0.039  α5,4 0.448  α6,4 0.861  α7,4 0.241  α8,4 -0.409 
    (.083)    (.199)    (.870)    (.148)    (.131) 
Type  α1,5 -0.584  α5,5 2.802    α7,5 -0.229  α8,5 0.013 
    (.181)   (.301)       (.224)   (.984) 
  α1,6 -0.110  α5,6 3.176    α7,6 -2.584  α8,6 -0.041 
    (.182)   (.342)       (.321)   (.863) 
  α1,7  0.002  α5,7 2.983    α7,7 -2.447  α8,7 -0.025 
    (.191)   (.342)       (.279)   (.887) 
  α1,8  0.400  α5,8 3.180    α7,8 -3.058  α8,8 0.710 
    (.205)   (.397)       (.315)   (.893) 
  α1,9 -0.108  α5,9 4.944    α7,9 -3.006  α8,9 1.420 
    (.206)   (.437)       (.292)   (.869) 
Black  α1,10 -0.117  α5,10 1.352  α6,10 -2.499  α7,10 0.049  α8,10 0.290 
    (.098)    (.236)    (.693)    (.133)    (.136) 
Hispanic  α1,11 -0.015  α5,11 1.735  α6,11 2.401  α7,11 -0.109  α8,11 -0.116 
    (.089)    (.203)    (.846)    (.139)    (.129) 
 
α2,1-N
* 0.539  α2,2-S  0.795  α2,3-A  0.064  α2,4-FC  0.056  α3,1-N1,6  0.800  α3,2-N7,13  0.349  α3,3-N14,18  0.349  Non-leisure 
Time    (.074)   (.081)   (.069)  (.031)   (.152)    (.088)    (.145) 
                       
α2-Hrs
2 -.00071  α10-LM  0.625  α14-B,S  -1.202  α18-B,a
2 -0.281  α22-S,16  0.473  α26-M25  6.005  α30-P,S12  .793  Other 
parameters    (.00004)     (.226)    (.243)    (.057)    (.239)    (1.247)    (.116) 
  α3-Kids  0.815  α11-F,S  -0.795  α15-LP  0.476  α19-B,a
3 0.0164  α23-S,18  0.619  α27-hCM   1.435  α31-P,16-17   .000 
    (.171)     (.277)    (.049)    (.0046)    (.128)     (.151)    (.048) 
  α4-Kds
2 -0.449  α12-P,S  -0.489  α16-LF  1.549  α20-B,a
4 -.00032  α24-B,18  -.597  α28-hCN   0.330  α32-C,M  -.195 
    (.027)    (.132)    (.135)    (.00013)    (.520)      (.084)    (.048) 
  α9-LS  -3.993  α13-LA  1.063  α17-B,a  1.361  α21-h*C  -3.962  α25-M,21  3.403  α29-F,S12  2.283     
     (.3273)    (.211)    (.343)       (.220)    (.691)      (.236)     
a Utility function parameters should be multiplied by 1000, and can be interpreted in thousands of dollars per period. Table A.3: Cont. 
 
Wage Function     
Constant  ω0,0 7.555  Other Parameters   
   (.034)    ω1-Educ 0.0928 
State Effects  ω0,1 0.0001     (.0037) 
     (.0095)    ω2-Ed
2/100 -0.0075 
  ω0,2 0.0008        (.0013) 
      (.0078)    ω3-Hours 0.0131 
  ω0,3 -0.0709       (.0011) 
       (.0099)    ω4-Hrs
2/100 -0.0090 
  ω0,4 -0.0594         (.0034) 
       (.0079)    ω5-LPT 0.0300 
ω0,5 -0.0009       (.0040) 
     (.0081)  ω6-LFT 0.0712 




Endowment         (.0093)  ω7-Age 0.0065 
  ω0,7 -0.100       (.0006) 
        (.0101)    ω8-Age<16 -0.1159 
  ω0,8 -0.200        (.0478) 
         (.0117)    ω9-Age<22 -0.1039 
  ω0,9 -0.224        (.0111) 
         (.0115)    ω10-Age<25 -0.0625 
Black  ω0,10 -0.125       (.0102) 
         (.0076)    ω11-PT -0.1053 
Hispanic  ω0,11 -0.056       (.0103) 
         (.0069)    w ε σ   .1708 
         (.0046) 
 
Husband Offer Wage Function          
Constant  m
00 γ   7.004  m
05 γ -B  -0.270   m
3 γ -Age
2/100  -0.084 
      (.160) 
Black 
   (.026)        (.028) 
m
01 γ -MI  0.097  Hispanic  m
06 γ -H  -0.130   m
4 γ -DUR  0.040  State Effects 
   (.027)       (.027)        (.004) 
  m
02 γ -NY  0.052  m
0 γ - Skill  1.947   m
5 γ -DUR
2/100  -0.040 
     (.027) 
Other 
Parameters      (.116)        (.011) 
  m
03 γ -NC  -0.194   m
1 γ -ED  0.029   μ σ -permanent  0.390 
     (.033)        (.004)       (.007) 
  m
04 γ -OH  0.099   m
2 γ -Age  0.084  μ σ -transitory  0.211 
     (.025)        (.013)       (.014) Table A.3: Cont. 
 
Parents’ Income Function       
Constant  z
0 γ   9.497  Black  z
1 γ -B  -3.921 
     (.144)     (.014) 
Other Parameters  z
1 γ -PS  1.042  Hispanic  z
1 γ -H  -2.030 
     (.019)     (.131) 
  z
2 γ -Age   -.305  Error Term  z ε σ   2.662 
      (.014)     (.046) 
Note: Parameters are in thousands of dollars per 6-month period. 
 
 
Parental Co-Residence            
π0
z -0.229  π1
z-Age  -0.0800  π2
z-A18  2.0897  π3
z-A22  0.5964  π4
z-A25  -0.2837  π5
z-LP  3.988    
  (.320)      (.0109)    (.2356)    (.1330)      (.1260)     (.0976)     
                 
Job Offer Probabilities            
π0
p 2.147  π1
p-LF  1.801  π1
f -1.801  π2
f-A22  -0.570        
  (.041)    (.079)    (.062)    (.052)        
              
Marriage Offer Probabilities
π0
m -1.853  π1
m-LM  4.228  π2
m-Age  0.126  π3
m-Age
2 -0.0034  π4
m-DUR  0.040  π5
m-A30  -0.667  π6
m-LA  -0.749 
 (.051)   (.075)   (.009)    (.0006)   (.008)    (.215)   (.104) 
                    
Parents’ Transfer Function                 
τ0
z -1.297  τ1
z-A16  -0.182  τ2
z-A18  -0.203  τ3
z-COL  0.065  τ4
z-C*PS  0.043       . 
  (.111)   (.218)   (.143)   (.169)    (.015)        
                    
Husband’s Transfer Function   Welfare Benefit Parameters         
τ0
m 0.183       $1 .7475  $2 .3760        
  (.127)         (.0731)    (.0019)        
Note: The parent transfer function parameters enter the latent index of a logit model, that determines the share of parent income devoted to the co-resident child’s 
consumption. In contrast, the husband transfer parameter enters a latent index that determines the share of total household income that the woman receives.  
 
 Table A.3: Cont. 
 
 
Standard Deviations of Taste Shocks        
Leisure School  Marriage  Birth Welfare     
σ1 1.025  σ2 1.748  σ3 2.635  σ4 9.473  σ5 0.656    
  (.104)   (.171)   (.384)   (.537)       (.198)     
                  
Cost of Attending School      Discount Factor     
β3 3079  β4 2603     *  .93      
   (380)     (698)        ----         
              
Measurement Error Parameters          
A.  Continuous  Outcomes             
wm σ   0.3949  mm σ   0.5582  zm σ   0.400  κ-m  -.309  κ-z  -.785    
    (.0014)    (.0030)    (.0020)    (.029)    (.023)     
                  
B.  Discrete  Outcomes              
ES 0.785 EH 0.838 EB 0.863 EG 0.923 EM 0.934 EP 0.898 
  (.009)   (.003)   (.008)    (.004)    (.003)    (.005) 
                 
ES0 0.936 ESP 0.865           




Type Probabilities: MNL Parameters           
    Type 2    Type 3    Type 4    Type 5    Type 6 
Constant  π20
 t 3.199  π30
 t 4.209  π40
 t 4.801  π50
 t 5.673  π60
 t 6.043 
    (1.892)    (1.858)    (1.754)   (1.617)   (1.653) 
Initial School  π21
 t -0.784  π31
 t -1.180  π41
 t -1.540  π51
 t -1.458  π61
 t -1.271 
    (.600)    (.557)    (.519)   (.477)   (.491) 
Parents’ School  π22
 t -0.187  π32
 t -0.172  π42
 t -0.095  π52
 t -0.209  π62
 t -0.357 
    (.158)    (.159)    (.164)   (.161)   (.149) 
Parents’ College  π23
 t 1.228  π33
 t 0.071  π43
 t -0.190  π53
 t -0.356  π63
 t 0.190 
   (.944)    (1.016)    (.976)    (.964)    (.915) 
                    
Initial School Distribution Conditional on Parents’ School: MNL Parameters          
  π02
s 1.809  π03
s 3.153  π04
s 3.467  π1
s-PS  0.157    
   (.855)    (.537)    (.336)    (.042)     
Note: As a location normalization, in the MNL for type, the latent index for type one is normalized to zero. In the MNL for initial schooling, the constant for level 1 
(the lowest level) is set to zero. Table A.3: Cont. 
 
Parents’ Schooling Distribution (by Race and State) 
GRADES STATE  White Black  Hispanic 
  CA  .1320  .2590  .5630 
<HS  MI  .2380  .2940   
(7-11)  NY  .1190  .3550  .5580 
  NC  .4090  .6550   
  OH  .1800  .4000   
 CA  .3380  .4810  .3190 
HS  MI .4750  .3530   
(12)  NY .4780  .4350  .2620 
  NC .4850  .3140   
  OH .5230  .4360   
  CA  .2061  .1671  .0609 
SC  MI  .1719  .2061   
(13-15)  NY  .1641  .1290  .1311 
  NC  .0450  .0150   
  OH  .0939  .1299   
 CA  .2210  .0560  .0470 
COL  MI .0900  .0880   
(16)  NY .1340  .0320  .0480 
 NC  .0300  .0100   
 OH  .1250  .0100   
  CA  .1130  .0369  .0100 
COL+  MI  .0251  .0589   
(17-20)  NY  .1049  .0490  .0010 
  NC  .0310  .0060   
  OH  .0781  .0241   
Note: The parent education proportions are not estimated jointly with the structural parameters of the model. They were calculated directly from the NLSY data.  
Note that there are 14 levels of education, with 4 categories within <HS, 3 categories with SC, and 4 categories within COL+.  We assume parents are distributed 
evenly across the subcategories within each of these levels. For example, for whites in CA, we assume that 13.20 )5 = 2.64% of parents are in each of the categories 
from 7 to 11. Small sample sizes preclude us from reliably estimating the size of each cell separately. Table 1 
 Choice Distributions by Age: Estimation Sample of the Combined Five States 
 
  Attending 
School 
Working 








Age  W  B  H  W  B  H  W  B  H  W  B  H  W  B  H 
14  100  93.3  100  14.3  10.5  12.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
15  97.7  100  100  11.4  9.9  5.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  3.4  1.0  1.0  1.3  0.0 
16  88.3  87.5  90.3  30.0  14.5  19.3  3.0  1.0  2.9  3.1  3.8  2.1  1.0  1.0  1.0 
17  84.6  80.7  79.2  50.0  26.9  32.4  8.7  1.4  6.4  5.6  5.3  2.5  1.3  2.5  2.3 
18  42.8  50.9  41.5  63.0  32.6  50.7  16.4  3.7  11.9  3.7  4.5  6.7  2.6  9.0  3.3 
19  32.5  32.1  27.1  65.6  43.4  51.2  24.9  7.1  19.9  4.5  8.6  5.6  3.6  15.6  6.8 
20  23.8  22.2  18.8  67.5  46.4  52.2  31.5  11.7  27.1  4.3  6.0  4.9  5.4  17.3  10.3 
21  19.4  12.3  12.2  69.6  49.2  58.3  37.1  14.4  34.2  6.0  7.9  6.3  5.1  21.2  13.7 
22  10.8  8.3  7.7  70.0  52.5  60.6  37.5  20.3  35.9  4.5  5.3  5.7  6.1  25.6  15.1 
23  4.2  6.2  3.9  72.0  54.2  58.5  49.1  22.3  39.7  5.9  6.1  5.3  6.2  27.2  15.3 
24  3.8  5.4  4.6  72.7  55.4  57.7  54.1  22.8  45.7  6.6  6.9  7.9  7.0  27.8  17.2 
25  4.0  5.9  2.9  73.8  62.8  55.6  58.5  20.9  47.2  7.6  7.0  7.2  6.4  26.8  16.0 
26-29  3.2  3.6  2.2  71.5  61.1  56.7  63.6  25.6  52.1  5.8  4.4  5.8  5.0  25.7  15.4 
30-33  4.5  2.3  2.6  72.6  63.3  64.9  72.8  32.0  56.7  4.3  2.3  5.3  2.6  22.3  14.5 
 
 Table 2 
 Summary Statistics of Total Monthly Benefits By Numbers of Children and Earnings by State: 1967-1990 
 
Monthly Earnings 
  Zero  $500  $1000 
  One child  Two children  One child  Two children  One child  Two children 
CA             
m    589  724  351  517   87  196 
 s   60    67  85    91   89  151 
Min  451  568  226  378     0      0 
Max  665  813  462  643  297  440 
1970  459  568  416  560  297  440 
1975  652  794  441  620  132  311 
1980  617  757  405  560  156  311 
1985  596  730  260  414     0   46 
1990  594  728  303  476     0  110 
             
MI             
m  654  809  429  621  150  304 
s  92  106  161  179  158  215 
Min  537  684  212  377     0    33 
Max   825            1000  697  916  430  650 
1970  671  830  585  799  302  516 
1975  735              912  551  762  273  483 
1980  660  808  424  602  152  330 
1985  561  705  235  405     0    58 
1990  551  694  293  484     0  156 
             
             






                                                                            
 
                 Table 2, continued 
 
NY             
m  574  718  334  514    92  204 
s    52     71  126  152    98  189 
Min  515  634  169  316      0      0 
Max  692              862  522  752  250  470 
1970  562  726  469  685  189  406 
1975  635  798  443  643  172  372 
1980  552  679  322  473    61  211 
1985  524  644  189  334     0     0 
1990  528  649  230  393     0   31 
             
NC             
m  480  566  274  384    35  132 
s   48    58    68    82    40    66 
Min  419  489  180   269     0     0 
Max  570              679  374  502  143  227 
1970  455  513  348  432  143  227 
1975  570  679  356  502    50  197 
1980  462  553  260  364    31  134 
1985  454  543  199  295     0    69 
1990  438  530  249             367   13  131 
             
             













                 Table 2, continued 
 
         
OH             
m  489  607  270  414    87  128 
s   34    43    69    88    36   87 
Min  450  559  174  291      0      0 
Max  552              688  393  540  123  270 
1970  460  565  361  511  106  256 
1975  552  688  339  514    27  202 
1980  499  619  284  423    11  151 
1985  459  570  185  305      0     0 
1990  455  566  218  346      0                0 
             
TX             
m  377  476  217  329   69  106 
s   50    60   51    73   21    43 
Min  301  367  145  226     0    49 
Max  455              562  348  497  279  228 
1970  417  514  297  429           169  201 
1975  445  561  253  398     0  117 
1980  334  436  198  295    0   96 
1985  375  474  170  264     0   52 
1990  343  442  181             287     0            101 
             
             













Actual and Predicted Choice Probabilities by Age for the Estimation Sample:  
 Multinomial Logit and Dynamic Programming Models 
 
        White    Black    Hispanic 
        Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP 
 
Percent Receiving                         
    Welfare                         
         Age 15-17.5    0.9  0.5  1.3      1.9    2.3  4.8      1.3    0.6    4.4 
         Age 18-21.5    4.3  3.4  4.3    16.9  16.6  15.0      9.2   5.4  10.6 
         Age 22-25.5    6.4  5.0  7.2    26.9  23.9  24.9    15.0  10.3  15.3 
         Age 26-29.5    4.7  4.5  7.1    21.6  21.6  27.9    15.2  10.2  15.7 
                             
Percent in School                         
         Age 15-17.5    86.4  81.4  85.3    86.3  82.0  84.2    84.6  84.2  79.2 
         Age 18-21.5    27.3  28.9  29.8    26.1  25.2  29.6    22.0  29.2  21.4 
         Age 22-25.5      5.2    5.4    8.3      6.3    6.3    8.0      5.0    5.2    6.0 
         Age 26-29.5      3.1    2.2    3.4      3.5    2.5    3.5      2.0    2.1    2.8 
                             
Percent Working                         
        Age 15-17.5    35.2  29.7  28.4    19.2  17.6  18.3    22.2  20.1  26.6 
        Age 18-21.5    66.7  66.3  64.0    44.1  47.9  54.0    52.8  53.0  58.8 
        Age 22-25.5    72.4  74.9  70.5    56.8  56.0  59.5    58.7  62.2  58.0 
        Age 26-29.5    71.1  78.7  69.7    61.1  62.1  57.6    56.1  66.8  55.3 
                             






        White    Black    Hispanic 
        Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP 
 
Percent Pregnant                         
         Age 15-17.5    2.5  2.1  1.9    4.6  2.9  3.0    3.2  3.8  3.2 
         Age 18-21.5    4.4  5.3  4.8    6.7  5.9  6.5    6.9  7.0  6.5 
         Age 22-25.5    5.5  6.0  5.1    5.8  6.2  7.3    6.7  7.1  7.7 
         Age 26-29.5    5.5  5.1  4.8    4.2  5.0  6.6    5.9  5.9  6.6 
                             
Children Born Before                       
         Age 20    0.32  0.32  0.31    0.53  0.39  0.47    0.40  0.43  0.48 
         Age 24    0.72  0.81  0.72    1.05  0.90  1.02    1.00  1.00  1.03 
         Age 28    1.26  1.24  1.13    1.41  1.20  1.62    1.60  1.49  1.62 
                             
Highest Grade                         
   Completed                         
        By Age 24    12.87  13.03  13.08    12.68  12.90  12.97    12.20  12.83  12.38 




Actual and Predicted Choice Probabilities for Validation Sample by Age:  
 Multinomial Logit and Dynamic Programming Models 
 
        White    Black    Hispanic 
        Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP 
 
Percent Receiving                         
    Welfare                         
         Age 15-17.5    0.0  0.1  0.1     0.6   0.8    1.3      1.3   0.4  0.5 
         Age 18-21.5    0.0  0.3  0.7     7.3   7.3    6.4      4.2   3.8  2.3 
         Age 22-25.5    0.8  0.5  1.6     7.8   9.1  13.0      5.0   4.8  4.9 
         Age 26-29.5    0.7  0.3  1.9     7.3   8.5  17.7      4.7   4.6  5.9 
                             
Percent in School                         
         Age 15-17.5    93.6  88.5  87.0    87.8  82.0  85.4    80.3  81.0  82.0 
         Age 18-21.5    36.5  38.4  31.1    27.9  25.2  29.1    29.8  31.4  22.5 
         Age 22-25.5      6.9    7.7   9.4      3.5    6.3   8.5      4.4    5.7   6.5 
         Age 26-29.5      4.4    3.7   4.0      1.9    2.5   3.8      4.5    3.4   3.0 
                             
Percent Working                         
        Age 15-17.5    39.3  37.3  38.2    24.7  18.6  24.2    24.1  21.6  33.3 
        Age 18-21.5    68.9  72.8  75.8    60.5  57.4  64.9    55.0  54.4  64.1 
        Age 22-25.5    80.0  84.2  82.0    73.1  71.5  70.7    68.1  68.5  64.5 
        Age 26-29.5    79.6  83.5  82.5    72.8  72.3  69.1    64.9  69.5  63.9 







        White    Black    Hispanic 
        Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP    Actual  MNL  DP 
 
Percent Pregnant                         
         Age 15-17.5    1.3  2.1  1.7    4.5  2.1  2.9    3.8  4.2  3.3 
         Age 18-21.5    3.7  5.3  4.8    6.9  4.9  6.7    6.7  6.6  7.1 
         Age 22-25.5    4.5  6.0  4.9    5.8  5.0  7.4    6.4  6.2  7.5 
         Age 26-29.5    4.2  5.1  4.8    3.5  3.9  6.6    4.9  5.2  7.0 
                             
Children Born Before                       
         Age 20    0.22  0.18  0.29    0.65  0.58  0.46    0.50  0.50  0.52 
         Age 24    0.49  0.56  0.68    1.12  0.99  1.03    1.06  1.06  1.11 
         Age 28    0.86  0.92  1.09    1.71  1.45  1.63    1.54  1.54  1.72 
                             
Highest Grade                         
   Completed                         
        By Age 24    13.27  13.47  13.24    12.81   12.71  13.02    12.21  12.41  12.49 
                             
 
 Table 5 
Additional Comparisons of Actual and Predicted Variables 
 for the Estimation and Validation Samples by Age and Race  
 
      White    Black    Hispanic 












      Actual  DP  Actual  DP    Actual  DP  Actual  DP    Actual  DP  Actual  DP 
Percent Married 
    Age 15-17.5      5.7    5.0   4.2  5.1      1.2   1.1    1.3  1.0      4.0   3.3    7.9  4.7 
    Age 18-21.5    28.9  27.6  21.6  26.2      9.7   9.3  19.9  8.6    23.2  22.7  26.4  29.3 
    Age 22-25.5    50.8  51.9  43.8  50.4    20.9  21.2  30.2  19.6    42.0  43.7  50.4  50.5 
    Age 26-29.5    64.4  65.6  51.8  63.7    25.3  28.3  41.0  26.2    53.4  55.7  60.2  61.2 
                                 
Percent Living                               
  With Parents                               
    Age 15-17.5    92.5  93.6  94.4  935    91.5  97.6  95.9  97.7    95.1  95.4  89.4  94.0 
    Age 18-21.5    57.5  56.7  54.9  58.0    68.6  71.8  75.6  72.6    63.1  60.6  61.5  54.5 
    Age 22-25.5    23.1  19.8  17.6  20.9    33.3  33.4  43.1  34.3    33.0  23.0  28.4  19.8 
    Age 26-29.5      9.4  10.4    8.3  11.2    21.3  23.3  24.5  23.8    20.2  13.9  15.9  11.7 
                                 
Mean Acc. FT Wage                             
    Age 15-17.5    4.51  4.39   5.31  4.59    4.12  3.84  5.98  3.94    4.58  4.11  4.94  4.09 
    Age 18-21.5    6.00  5.72   6.57  5.75    5.76  4.96  5.75  4.95    5.95  5.35  5.75  5.15 
    Age 22-25.5    8.02  7.87   8.88  7.89    6.91  6.99  7.02  6.84    7.70  7.34  6.91  7.08 
    Age 26-29.5    8.95  9.20  10.09  9.20    8.25  8.18  8.15  8.01    8.97  8.31  7.63  8.07 
                                 
Mean Acc. PT Wage                             
    Age 15-17.5    4.08  3.95  4.02  3.95    4.73  3.43  4.99  3.48    4.30  3.76  4.13  3.61 
    Age 18-21.5    4.89  5.07  4.85  5.11    4.82  4.42  5.34  4.39    4.85  4.71  4.99  4.54 
    Age 22-25.5    6.40  6.55  8.15  6.61    5.61  5.68  5.30  5.59    5.99  6.01  5.09  5.74 
    Age 26-29.5    7.67  7.75  8.04  7.86    6.58  6.75  4.89  6.54    7.06  7.07  5.13  6.70 
  
 
Table 5, continued 
 
      White    Black    Hispanic 












      Actual  DP  Actual  DP    Actual  DP  Actual  DP    Actual  DP  Actual  DP 
 
Husband’s Income                              
    Age 18-21.5      9,554  9,734  13,401  9,524      6,625  6.085  8,073  6,332      6,874    7,663    6,559   6,601 
    Age 22-25.5    12,024  12,301  16,713  11,870      8,369  7,789  8,082  7,987       9,157    9,527    9,098   8,313 
    Age 26-29.5    15,345  14,455  17,680  13,973    12,995  9,510  6,443  9,569    11,179  11,354  11,626  10,068 
                                 
Income of Parents                             
  (if co-reside)                             
    Age 15-17.5    16,408  15,857  21,079  16,155    11,022  10,667  13,396  10,471    12,285  11,738  12,187  10,806 
    Age 18-21.5    14,259  14,649  17,411  15,069      8,720    9,525    8,622   9,443    10,956  10,658    9,534   9,973 
    Age 22-25.5    12,003  13,142  11,449  13,636      5,958    8,075    6,496   7,936      8,878    8,962    6,355   8,223 
                                 
Works PT                                         
    Age 15-17.5    29.6  23.5  33.7  30.9    14.8  13.1  15.1  21.3    17.7  22.3  17.5  28.2 
    Age 18-21.5    29.5  30.6  28.9  34.6    23.0  31.3  27.1  36.2    27.3  28.9  23.7  31.1 
    Age 22-25.5    17.5  16.1  11.5  18.3    16.9  16.3  18.0  19.5    19.0  14.6  12.7  17.6 
    Age 26-29.5    18.9  14.6   6.6  16.5    13.1  13.1  13.4  16.5    15.0  12.1   9.4  16.2 
                               
Works FT                                         
    Age 15-17.5      5.6   4.8   5.6   7.3      1.5    1.5   4.5   2.9     4.5   4.3   6.6  5.2 
    Age 18-21.5    37.3  33.4  40.0  41.2    21.0  22.7  33.4  28.7    25.6  29.9  31.3  33.1 
    Age 22-25.5    54.8  54.4  68.5  63.7    39.9  43.2  55.1  51.2    39.7  43.3  55.4  46.9 





Root Mean Squared Error for Alternative MNL Specifications and for DP Model – Selected Choice Variables   
 
        Whites     
      Estimation Sample    Validation Sample 
                     
      MNL1 




  FE        
MNL2 
No FE 
DP        MNL1 




  FE   
MNL2 
No FE 
DP   
Welfare  .011  .012  .012  .011  .014        .010  .010  .010  .815  .012   
      (Mean)    (.043)        (.004) 
                               
                               
Work    .054  .051  .049  .048  .046        .068  .093  .068  .255  .077   
     (Mean)    (.631)        (.688) 
                                 
                                 
Pregnancy    .012  .012  .013  .012  .012        .019  .022  .019  .442  .021   
     (Mean)    (.046)        (.036) 
                               
                               
In School    .045  .044  .045  .047  .028        .046  .086  .045  .138  .054   
     (Mean)    (.268)        (.045) 




Table 6, continued 
Root Mean Square Error for Alternative MNL Specifications and for DP Model – Selected Choice Variables   
        Blacks     
      Estimation Sample    Validation Sample 
                     
      MNL1 




  FE        
MNL2 
No FE 
DP        MNL1 




  FE   
MNL2 
No FE 
DP   
 
Welfare  .030  .028  .027  .026  .027        .021  .030  .021  .844  .063   
      (Mean)    (.189)      (.061) 
                               
                               
Work    .035  .030  .034  .032  .066        .059  .054  .058  .215  .065   
     (Mean)    (.470)      (.600) 
                                 
                                 
Pregnancy    .015  .015  .016  .016  .021        .034  .037  .033  .490  .036   
     (Mean)    (.054)      (.052) 
                               
                               
In School    .031  .031  .028  .032  .034        .044  .047  .046  .224  .048   
     (Mean)    (.269)      (.264) 




Table 6, continued 
Root Mean Square Error for Alternative MNL Specifications and for DP Model – Selected Choice Variables   
 
          Hispanics     
      Estimation Sample      Validation Sample 
                     
      MNL1 




  FE        
MNL2 
No FE 
DP        MNL1 




  FE   
MNL2 
No FE 
DP   
 
Welfare  .044  .052  .049  .050  .024        .014  .018  .014  .842  .019   
      (Mean)    (.108)      (.040) 
                               
                               
Work    .067  .071  .059  .064  .048        .050  .062  .048  .169  .092   
     (Mean)    (.491)      (.550) 
                                 
                                 
Pregnancy    .015  .015  .015  .015  .019        .022  .025  .022  .487  .030   
     (Mean)    (.059)      (.056) 
                               
                               
In School    .050  .048  .049  .050  .033        .034  .059  .034  .177  .058   
     (Mean)    (.246)      (.264) 





Counterfactual of Other States with Texas Welfare Benefits – Multinomial Logits and DP Comparison 
        Whites     
           
        MNL1 FE             MNL1 No FE    DP   




    Baseline  With 
Texas 
    Baseline  With 
Texas 




                           
Age 15-17.5     0.9     0.5    3.0       0.6  0.2       1.3   0.4     
Age 18-21.5     4.3     3.4  19.4       3.6  1.1       4.3   3.0     
Age 22-25.5     6.4     5.0  25.9       4.8  1.1       7.2   5.5     
Age 26-29.5     4.7     4.5  17.1       4.5  0.7       7.1   5.8     
                                 
Percent  In School                             
Age 15-17.5    86.4    81.4  82.6      80.4  78.2      85.3  85.4     
Age 18-21.5    27.3    28.9  26.5      27.7  21.1      29.8  29.9     
Age 22-25.5      5.2      5.4   4.6        5.3   2.8        8.3   8.3     
Age 26-29.5      3.1      2.2   2.0        2.4   1.3        3.4   3.5     
                               
Percent  Working                             
Age 15-17.5    35.2    29.7  15.6      29.8  32.9      28.4  27.8     
Age 18-21.5    66.7    66.3  37.0      66.5  77.6      64.0  64.1     
Age 22-25.5    72.4    74.9  40.4      74.5  87.1      70.5  71.8     




Table 7, continued 
        Whites     
           
        MNL1 FE             MNL1 No FE    DP   




    Baseline  With 
Texas 
    Baseline  With 
Texas 
   
 
Percent Pregnant                             
Age 15-17.5    2.5    2.1    3.6      2.2  1.5      1.9  1.9     
Age 18-21.5    4.4    5.3  15.4      5.4  4.7      4.8  4.8     
Age 22-25.5    5.5    6.0  16.9      6.0  5.2      5.1  5.1     
Age 26-29.5    5.5    5.1  10.8      5.1  4.6      4.8  4.8     
                                 
Children Ever Born 
Before Age 
                           
20    0.32    0.32  0.67      0.34  0.30      0.31  0.31     
                               
24    0.72    0.81  1.85      0.82  0.74      0.72  0.71     
                               
28    1.26    1.25  2.76      1.27  1.14      1.13  1.13     
                               
Highest Grade 
Completed 
                           
By Age 25    12.87    13.03  12.93      12.97  12.68      13.08  13.09     
                               
                               




Table 7, continued 
 
        Blacks     
           
        MNL1 FE             MNL1 No FE    DP   




    Baseline  With 
Texas 
    Baseline  With 
Texas 




                           
Age 15-17.5    1.9    2.3   7.3      2.5  1.1      4.8  3.1     
Age 18-21.5    16.9    16.6  42.3      17.5  8.2      15.0  12.2     
Age 22-25.5    26.9    23.9  57.9      24.9  9.6      24.9  20.4     
Age 26-29.5    21.6    21.6  53.0      22.1  7.1      27.9  24.3     
                                 
Percent  In School                             
Age 15-17.5    86.3    82.0  78.8      81.6  80.6      84.2  84.6     
Age 18-21.5    26.1    25.2  18.0      25.7  19.5      29.6  29.9     
Age 22-25.5     6.3    6.3   3.0      6.6  3.0      8.0  8.2     
Age 26-29.5     3.5    2.5   1.0      2.7  1.3      3.5  3.6     
                               
Percent  Working                             
Age 15-17.5    19.2    17.6   9.6      17.6  20.1      18.3  18.1     
Age 18-21.5    44.1    47.9  22.5      46.4  62.3      54.0  54.9     
Age 22-25.5    56.8    56.0  23.3      55.3  75.1      59.5  62.9     




Table 7, continued 
        Blacks     
           
        MNL1 FE            MNL1 No FE    DP   




    Baseline  With 
Texas 
    Baseline  With 
Texas 
   
 
Percent Pregnant                             
Age 15-17.5    4.6    2.9    5.4      2.9  1.5      3.0  3.0     
Age 18-21.5    6.7    5.9  21.4      5.9  5.1      6.5  6.5     
Age 22-25.5    5.8    6.2  22.5      6.1  5.7      7.3  7.3     
Age 26-29.5    4.2    5.0  14.4      5.0  4.9      6.6  6.6     
                                 
Children Ever Born 
Before Age 
                           
20    0.53    0.39  0.96      0.40  0.34      0.47  0.47     
                               
24    1.05    0.90  2.52      0.91  0.82      1.02  1.02     
                               
28    1.41    1.30  3.90      1.33  1.21      1.62  1.62     
                               
Highest Grade 
Completed 
                           
By Age 25    12.68    12.90  12.56      12.92  12.62      12.97  13.00     
                               
                               




Table 7, continued 
 
        Hispanics     
           
        MNL1 FE             MNL1 No FE    DP   




    Baseline  With 
Texas 
    Baseline  With 
Texas 




                           
Age 15-17.5    1.3    0.6   8.7      0.6  0.1      4.4  1.7     
Age 18-21.5     9.2     5.4  49.0      5.1  0.8      10.6   7.0     
Age 22-25.5    15.0    10.3  57.5      8.9  1.2      15.3  10.2     
Age 26-29.5    15.2    10.2  34.5      9.1  0.9      15.7  11.6     
                                 
Percent  In School                             
Age 15-17.5    84.6    84.2  80.9      84.4  82.6      79.2  79.4     
Age 18-21.5    22.0    29.2  20.5      28.8  23.3      21.4  21.6     
Age 22-25.5     5.0    5.2   4.2      4.9  2.7      6.0  6.1     
Age 26-29.5     2.0    2.1   1.3      2.0  1.2      2.8  2.9     
                               
Percent  Working                             
Age 15-17.5    22.2    20.1   8.7      20.2  24.0      26.6  26.4     
Age 18-21.5    52.8    53.0  14.6      54.4  70.9      58.8  59.7     
Age 22-25.5    58.7    62.2  15.6      63.8  83.6      58.0  61.2     




Table 7, continued 
        Hispanics     
           
        MNL1 FE           MNL1 No FE    DP   




    Baseline  With 
Texas 
    Baseline  With 
Texas 
   
 
Percent Pregnant                             
Age 15-17.5    3.2    3.8    7.6      3.8  1.5      3.2  3.1     
Age 18-21.5    6.9    7.0  30.0      6.9  5.2      6.5  6.6     
Age 22-25.5    6.7    7.1  30.2      7.6  6.1      7.1  7.1     
Age 26-29.5    5.9    5.9  17.5      5.9  5.4      6.6  6.6     
                                 
Children Ever Born 
Before Age 
                           
20    0.40    0.43  1.29      0.43  0.30      0.48  0.48     
                               
24    1.00    1.00  3.35      0.96  0.78      1.03  1.02     
                               
28    1.60    1.49  5.06      1.44  1.23      1.62  1.61     
                               
Highest Grade 
Completed 
                           
By Age 25    12.20    12.80  12.50      12.94  12.53      12.38  12.40     
                               
                               





Counterfactual Experiment: Other States With Texas Benefits – Additional Variables  
                                 
                      White                   Black                Hispanic 
                     
      Actual  Baseline  DP      Actual  Baseline  DP      Actual  Baseline  DP   
 
Percent Married                             
    Age 14-17.5      4.4  5.0  5.7        1.0  1.1  1.4        3.1  3.3  4.1   
    Age 18-21.5    28.9  27.6  29.3        9.7  9.3  10.6      23.2  22.7  25.1   
    Age 22-25.5    50.8  51.9  53.0      20.9  21.2  22.3      42.0  43.7  45.5   
    Age 26-29.5    64.4  65.6  65.9      25.3  28.2  28.8      53.4  55.7  56.9   
                                 
Percent Living                               
  With Parents                               
    Age 14-17.5    94.4  93.6  92.8      92.0  97.6  97.3      96.3  95.4  94.6   
    Age 18-21.5    57.5  56.7  55.3      68.6  71.8  70.8      63.1  58.5  58.5   
    Age 22-25.5    23.1  19.6  19.4      33.3  33.4  33.0      33.0  22.3  22.3   
    Age 26-29.5      9.4  10.4  10.4      21.3  23.3  23.1      20.2  13.5  13.5   
                                 
Mean Accepted                             
  Wage                               
    Age 14-17.5    3.82  3.95  3.94      4.65  3.43  3.41      3.90  3.76  3.75   
    Age 18-21.5    5.54  5.06  5.06      5.29  4.42  4.41      3.39  4.71  4.69   
    Age 22-25.5    7.63  6.51  6.51      6.51  5.68  5.62      7.17  6.01  5.92   




Table 8, continued 
 
                      White                   Black                 Hispanic 
                     
      Actual  Baseline  DP      Actual  Baseline  DP      Actual  Baseline  DP   
                                 
Income of Parents                             
    Age 18-21.5      9,554  9,813  9,656        6,625  6,085  5,890        6,874  7,663  7,477   
    Age 22-25.5    12,024  12,301  12,237        8,369  7,786  7,710         9,157  9,527  9,425   
    Age 26-29.5    15,345  14,455  14,457      12,995  9,511  9,462      11,179  11,354  11,330   
                                 
Income of Parents                             
  (if co-reside)                             
    Age 14-17.5    16,408  15,692  15,688      11,022  10,520  10,524      12,285  11,566  11,570   
    Age 18-21.5    14,259  14,649  14,653        8,720  9,542  9,540      10,956  10,658  10,643   
    Age 22-25.5    12,003  13,142  13,153        5,958  8,096  8,094        8,878  8,961  8,972   
                                 
Works PT                                         
    Age 14-17.5    24.8  23.5  23.2      14.8  16.3  16.1      14.8  22.3  22.2   
    Age 18-21.5    29.5  30.6  30.8      23.0  31.3  32.2      27.3  28.9  29.7   
    Age 22-25.5    17.5  16.1  16.7      16.9  16.3  18.1      19.0  14.6  16.2   
    Age 26-29.5    18.9  14.5  14.9      13.1  13.1  14.9      15.0  12.1  13.3   
                               
Works FT                                         
    Age 14-17.5      4.3  4.8  4.7       1.5  2.0  1.9       3.7  4.3  4.2   
    Age 18-21.5    37.3  33.4  33.4      21.0  22.7  22.8      25.6  29.9  30.0   
    Age 22-25.5    54.8  54.4  55.1      39.9  43.2  44.8      39.7  43.3  45.0   
    Age 26-29.5    52.3  55.2  56.3      47.9  44.5  46.7      41.1  43.1  45.6   
 
 